Page 82 - Absolute Predestination With Observations On The Divine Attributes

Divine poet sets out on this exalted principle: he puts it in front of the noblest
poem in the world, as a testimony both of his wisdom and his faith. It was as if
he had said, "I shall sing of numberless events, equally grand, entertaining, and
important, but I cannot begin to unfold them without laying down this, as a first

fundamental axiom, that though brought to pass by the instrumental agency of
men, they were the fruit of God's determining will, and of His all-directing

providence."

Neither are those minuter events, which, seemingly, are the result of chance,
excluded from this law. Even these do not happen, but come to pass in a regular
order of succession, and at their due period of time. "Causa pendet ex causa:

privata ac publica longus ordo rerum trahit," says Seneca: "Cause proceeds
from cause: the long train of things draws with it all events, both public and

private." Excellent is that of Sophocles (Aj. Flagell.): "I am firmly of opinion
that all these things, and whatever else befall us, are in consequence of the
Divine purpose; whoso thinks otherwise is at liberty to follow his own

judgment, but this will ever be mine."

The Longus ordo rerum, mentioned by Seneca, is what he elsewhere styles
Causarum implexa series, or a perpetual implication of causes. This, according

to Laertius, was called by the stoics aitia twn ontwn eiromenh, an involved
or concatenate causality of whatever has any existence, for eirmoV is a chain or

implicate connection. Agreeably to this idea, Chrysippus gives the following
definition of fate: "Fate is that natural, established order and constitution of all
things from everlasting, whereby they mutually follow upon each other in

consequence of an immutable and perpetual complication." Let us examine this
celebrated definition of fate.

(1) He calls it a naturalsuntaxiV: meaning by nature the great Natura Prima,
or God; for, by some stoics, God and nature are used promiscuously. But
because the Deity must be supposed both to decree and to act with wisdom,

intelligence, and design, fate is sometimes mentioned by them under the name
of LogoV or reason. Thus they define fate (Laert. in Zen.) to be that supreme
reason whereby the world is governed and directed; or, more minutely, thus:

that reason, whereby the things that have been, were; the things that now are,
have a present existence; and the things that are to be shall be. Reason, you see,
or wisdom, in the Deity, is an antecedent cause, from whence both providence

and inferior nature are derived. It is added, in Strobæus, that Chrysippus
sometimes varies his terms, and, instead of the word reason, substitutes the