Page 90 - Absolute Predestination With Observations On The Divine Attributes

blessings are absolutely His own, and which He may, therefore, without injustice, give or not give at
His pleasure. Dr. Whitby himself, though so strenuous an adversary to everything that looks like
predestination, yet very justly observes (and such a concession from such a pen merits the reader's
attention): "Locum non habet [scil. proswpolhyia] in bonis mere liberis et gratuitis: neque in iis
in quibus, unum alteri præferre, nostri arbitrii out privilegii est."—Ethic. Compend., l. 2, c. 5, sect.
9, i.e., "The bestowing [and consequently the withholding] of such benefits, as are merely gratuitous
and undeserved, does not argue respect of persons; neither is it respect of persons to prefer one
before another when we have a right and it is our pleasure so to do."

I shall only add the testimony of Thomas Aquinas, a man of some genius and much application,
who, though in very many things a laborious trifler, was yet, on some subjects, a clear reasoner and
judicious writer. His words are: "Duplex est datio; una quidem pertinens ad justitiam; qua scilicet,
aliquis dat alicui quod ei debetur; et circa tales dationes attenditur personarum acceptio. Alia est
datio ad liberalitatem pertinens; qua, scilicet, gratis datur alicui quod ei non debetur. Et talis est
Collatio munerum gratiæ, per quæ peccatores assumuntur a Deo. Et, in hac donatione, non habet
locum personarum acceptio; quia quilibet, absque injustitia, potest de suo dare quantum vult, et cui
vult: secundum illud (Matt. 20.). Annon licet mihi quod volo facere? tolle quod tuum est et vade," i.
e., "There is a twofold rendering or giving, the one a matter of justice, whereby that is paid to a man
which was due to him. Here it is possible for us to act partially and with respect of persons." [Thus,
for example's sake, if I owe money to two men, one of whom is rich, the other poor, and I pay the
rich man because he has it in his power to sue me, but defraud the other because of his inability to
do himself justice, I should be a respecter of persons. But as Aquinas goes on]: "There is a second
kind of rendering or giving, which is a branch of mere bounty and liberality, by which that is freely
bestowed on any man which was not due to him: such are the gifts of grace whereby sinners are
received of God. In the bestowment of grace respect of persons is absolutely out of the question,
because everyone may, and can, without the least shadow of injustice, give as much of his own as he
will and to whom he will, according to that passage in Matt. 20., 'Is it not lawful for me to do what I
will [with my own]? take up that which is thine and go thy way.'"—Aquin. Summ. Theol. 2-2dæ Qu.
63, A. 1.

On the whole it is evident that respect of persons can only have place in matters of justice, and is but
another name for perversion of justice, consequently it has nothing to do with matters of mere
goodness and bounty, as all the blessings of grace and salvation are.

41. Tom. 2, Epist. 105, ad Sixtum Presb.

42. De Corrept. et Grat., chap. 3.

43. De Bon. Persev., cap. 14.

44. A friend of mine, who has a large property in Ireland, was conversing one day with a popish
tenant of his upon religion. Among other points, they discussed the practice of having public prayers
in an unknown tongue. My friend took down a New Testament from his book case and read part of 1
Cor. 14. When he had finished, the poor zealous papist rose up from his chair and said with great
vehemence, "I verily believe St. Paul was a heretic!"

Can the person who carefully reads the epistles of that great apostle doubt of his having been a