Page 107 - NS-2 Textbook

100 MARITIME HISTORY

THE JAPANESE DEFENSE PERIMETER Then came an electrifying surprise U.s. attack on the
Japanese home islands. In April 1942, Halsey's carrier
The Japanese had now established their defense perime-
sh'iking force boldly sailed deep into Japanese waters
ter. Anchored by Rangoon in the Indian Ocean area, it in-
with sixteen long-range Army B-25s lashed to the flight
cluded all of the Dutch East Indies and northern New deck of the aircraft carrier USS Homel. The plan was to
Guinea on the south, extending to include Rabaul on
latmch the bombers on a one-way mission to the Japa-
New Britain and Kavieng on nearby New Ireland in the
nese home islands as soon as the force approached
southwest. It then crossed the Pacific northward to
within maximum range. On 18 April the all-volunteer
newly acqub'ed Wake, Guam, and the British Gilbert Is-
pilots, led by Army Lieutenant Colonel James Doolittle,
lands. On the northern flank Japan was protected by
successfully took off when the force had come within 660
bases in the Kurile Islands. Japan had also improved its miles of Japan. They made air raids on Tokyo, Nagoya,
many bases in the islands acquired from Germany dur-
and Kobe. None of the B-25s were lost over Japan. TIley
ing World War I-the Carolines, Marshalls, and Mari-
then continued on into China, since they did not have
anas. Japan made Truk in the Carolines into its "Pearl sufficient fuel to return to the carrier. There the pilots
Harbor" of the central Pacific and developed Rabaul into
crash-landed or parachuted to the grotmd. Most escaped
a major forward base for further expansion southwest-
in friendly Chinese territOlY, though some were caphrred
ward. Only on the central perimeter, near Midway Is- and executed in Japanese-controlled areas.
land, did a gap exist. Admiral Yamamoto wanted to seal
The Japanese armed forces were humiliated. Their
this gap, but the Japanese General Staff felt it was not
boast that the sacred territory of the Land of the Rising
necessary. Stm ·would never be attacked ,vas proved wrong. Ya-
The Japanese hoped that their string of we11-
mamoto's plans to attack Midway in June in order to
defended bases and their fine navy would be sufficient
close the gap in the Japanese defense perimeter were
to keep the growing American strength at bay. They no,,,, revived. Another Japanese move into the Coral Sea
hoped to defeat newly arriving American forces bit by bit
to cut the sea-lanes to Australia was put into action for
in a prolonged war of attrition. This, they hoped, would
early May. A third Japanese move, a two-pronged thrust
cause the American people to become disheartened and into the Solomon Islands and toward Port Moresby in
willing to make a compromise peace that would let Japan
New Guinea, also was started. Nirnitz, aware of these in-
keep her newly acquired territory. But Admiral Nimitz,
tentions through decoding of Japanese messages,
the U.S. Navy, and the American people would not let planned his own actions carefully.
the Japanese achieve their hopes.
BATTLE OF THE CORAL SEA
LIMITED OFFENSE BECOMES THE BEST DEFENSE
Ninlltz directed his carrier task groups to converge on the
Admiral Nimitz knew that the Japanese were planning Coral Sea to stop the Japanese moves toward the Solo-
additional moves to the southwest. Unknmvn to theIn, mons. The Lexillgtoll and her group were sent to reinforce
the Japanese naval code had been broken by U.S. naval Rear Admiral Frank Jack Fletcher's Yorktowil group.
intelligence. Thus, on many crucial occasions throughout On 8 May the Battle of the Coral Sea was fought. It
the war, Japanese plans were known ahead of time. This was the first great cOlnbat between carrier forces, with
allowed successful countermeasures to be planned and neither fleet ever coming into sight of the other. Both
executed. Nimitz felt that he could best defend the sea- groups latmched their attack waves about the same time.
lanes to Australia by attacking Japanese bases in the cen- The Japanese had several advantages: fliers with more
tral Pacific with carrier task forces in a series of hit-and- combat experience, better torpedoes, and a storm front
run raids. TIlis "\vould cause much concern in the that partly concealed their movements. The opposing
Japanese high command. Yamamoto himself was afraid waves hit the two task groups almost simultaneously.
that the Americans might even attempt a raid on Tokyo The Japanese carrier SllOkakll was severely damaged, and
and endanger the emperor's life. both the Yorktowll and Lexillgtoll were hit. The Lexillgtoll
Vice Admiral William Halsey was selected as the was struck by two torpedoes, which ruptured her fuel
man to strike the Japanese bases. He was to conduct lines and caused major explosions. TI,e ship had to be
raids at widely separated locations so as to cause the abandoned and was later slmk by one of her own escort-
Japanese the most anxiety. Halsey even hoped to make ing destroyers.
them believe that there were more u.s. naval task forces The Battle of the Coral Sea hrrned back the Japanese
in the region than they thought existed. Back home the advance for the first time in the Pacific war. Even though
press exaggerated the effects of the raids and greatly the American losses 'were somewhat greatel~ the strategic
boosted American public morale, and so the raids victOlY was clearly on the side of the United States.
achieved part of their purpose. While only one Japanese carrier ,vas sunk, another was