Page 20 - History of War - Issue 30-16

SOMME
1916 2016
Somme offensive, but it was the French who
French general Joseph Joffre proposed that chose the time and place for the battle. Haig, “MOST OF THE SOLDIERS WERE
the offensive should take place in the area
who was i ghting on French soil, acquiesced to
that overlooked the River Somme. The British French wishes where possible and the date for CONVINCED THAT THE ‘BIG
did not believe there was strategic merit in his
plan, apart from the fact that the British Third the offensive was set: 1 July 1916. PUSH’ WOULD BE THE KEY TO
Army was located on the Somme and would
Once the offensive was agreed, Haig and his WINNING THE WAR”
have to take part alongside the French. The The worst laid plans?
British went away to mull over the plans.
After Chantilly, General Sir Douglas Haig subordinates created an ambitious plan for
took over command of the British Expeditionary the battle. It was divided into several phases, had an inadequate amount of artillery, except
Force (BEF) on 19 December, and agreed with down a 40-kilometre-long front. To begin with, for heavy guns. Also, shrapnel did not always
Joffre’s plan. The Somme sector was ill-suited Henry Rawlinson’s Fourth Army was to capture cut wire effectively, but it was the only high
for an offensive, as its chalky soil was ideal enemy positions on a line between Serre and explosive available in 1916.
for digging defensive positions and the British Montauban, while Edmund Allenby’s Third Army At this point in the war, the British Army was
would be attacking the German ‘belly’ of their would attack Gommecourt as a diversion. The largely untested as a i ghting force. In 1914,
line, an area that bulged forwards, towards Fourth Army would then swing to the left to the BEF had been a highly professional but
Allied positions. Even if a breakthrough were capture the German second line from the River small army and it had suffered severe losses in
achieved, it risked leading nowhere. Ancre to Pozières, then attack to the right, the opening stages of the conl ict, requiring it
Haig proposed an alternative offensive south of the Albert-Bapaume road, followed by to be virtually replaced by volunteers.
centred on Messines, an area that was close a further advance onto the German third line, In an 18-month period the BEF underwent a
enough to the coast to be supported by the which included Le Sars, Flers and Morval. tenfold expansion and by mid-1916 Haig had
Royal Navy. This plan might have worked, as the If these attacks were successful, then three hundreds of thousands of men at his disposal,
German defences here were not as formidable cavalry divisions would advance in different but his troops were highly inexperienced.
as they would soon become in 1917, and Haig directions towards Arras. To support the Training an effective army takes time but in
was willing to wait for newly invented tanks to British, the French Sixth Army would attack to 1916 speed was of the essence and even
help the advance. However, after the German Rawlinson’s right. If everything went well, the equipment was scarce in the British ranks. In
offensive at Verdun was launched in February British planned to reach Cambrai and Douai in the case of the artillery, the new gunners had
1916, this plan was hastily abandoned. The order to break the German line in half. to train with logs and only practiced at camp
French were forced to throw in the bulk of their These plans were complicated, but the for a few weeks before being dispatched to the
troops to prevent this sector from falling, and Allies could not hope to progress without front. The volunteers had joined up on a wave
Allied priorities rapidly changed. The British now i rst destroying the dense German defences of enthusiastic patriotism and many had been
had to take the bulk of responsibility for the of barbed wire, trenches and artillery. To formed into ‘Pals Battalions’ consisting of local
that end, Haig planned a seven-day artillery men from the same towns, but their keenness
bombardment to destroy the German positions to i ght did not necessarily equate to i ghting
before the general advance. The British Fourth ability and for many the upcoming offensive
Army had 1,010 i eld guns and howitzers, would be their i rst test. The dei ciencies were
182 heavy guns and 245 heavy howitzers. not particularly noticed at the time, most of
What sounds like a large arsenal was actually the soldiers were convinced that the ‘Big Push’
insufi cient for the task in hand and the British would be the key to winning the war.

British gunners i re a 15-inch
howitzer on 1 July. A huge,
seven-day artillery barrage
failed to break the German
defences prior to the battle

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