Page 50 - Sports Illustrated for Kids Magazine (December 2019)

S
THE Y HALL
P
NO T A SS
Miami’s quarterbacks,
Ryan Fitzpatrick (14)
and Josh Rosen, have
been overwhelmed by
opposing pass rushers
while playing behind
an overmatched
offensive line.
By the time Ballage had showered and changed about
an hour or so later, the frustration hadn’t abated. “Losing,”
Ballage said. “It stinks.” Elsewhere in the locker room, cen-
ter Daniel Kilgore, a team captain and nine-year veteran
who emphasized the need to remain positive, acknowledged,
“This is a difficult time to be a Miami Dolphin.”
They’re the latest test case in a strategy that has been
sweeping pro sports. We’ve seen it from baseball teams (the
Astros and the Cubs in the last decade), NBA franchises
(the pre-LeBron Cavaliers and “the Process” 76ers), and,
in football, the analytics-driven Browns. All, including the
Dolphins, have refused to utter the T-word—tanking. But
there’s no denying that the Dolphins are, purposely, not
constructed to win.
Stephen Ross, frustrated with entrenched mediocrity
during his decade of ownership, decided after consecutive
losing seasons that the team needed a radical change of
course. Since August 31, it’s traded away three starters: two
of them recent first-round picks, left tackle Laremy Tunsil
(to Houston) and defensive back Minkah Fitzpatrick (to
Pittsburgh), and the other a trade acquisition who earned a
OCTOBER 7, 2019 lucrative extension, wideout Kenny Stills (to Houston with
Tunsil). Miami has a cash payroll that’s $26.2 million less
than the next lowest team’s.
The Cubs and the Astros emerged on the other side with
SPORTS ILLUSTRATED • a championship. While the Sixers have not advanced past
the conference semifinals stage they reached two seasons
before their teardown began, they are now among the five
heaviest favorites to win the 2020 NBA title. But in the NFL,
there’s no definitive example that this strategy works—at
least not yet. The Browns’ 1–31 stretch helped build what
50 some see as a championship-caliber core—anchored by No. 1
overall draft picks Baker Mayfield and Myles Garrett—but
four games into the 2019 season they sat at 2–2.
The only guarantee for the Dolphins is that this season
will be painful. After that, it’s a binary path: They will ei-
ther become analytical darlings who prove the concept of
tanking in the NFL, or, as some around the league believe,
they will become a cautionary tale.
RIAN FLORES was officially hired as the Dolphins’
B new head coach just hours after calling the defensive
plays in Super Bowl LIII, his fourth championship
as a member of the Patriots. He held a variety of
roles in his 15 years with the organization—scouting as-
sistant, position coach, de facto defensive coordinator—but
the one constant since he was first hired in 2004 was the
team’s success. This season has been, and will be, unlike
anything he has experienced.
Flores and GM Chris Grier are resetting their books,
which carry a league-high $55 million in dead cap hits from
players they cut or traded. Through trades they’ve bolstered
their future draft assets to include three first-round and
two second-round picks in 2020, plus two first-rounders
and two second-rounders in ’21.
Still, there’s evidence to suggest that this rebuild has been
even more extreme than Miami originally planned. Grier
said in a mid-September press conference that the Dolphins
weren’t looking to trade Tunsil, until the Texans presented
an offer that even Tunsil agreed they couldn’t refuse. They
didn’t foresee a frustrated Minkah Fitzpatrick forcing his
Around the league, the Dolphins’ approach has elicited
way out of town.
mixed reviews, the most common being skepticism. There are LAURA HEALD