Page 237 - Nursing: The Philosophy and Science of Caring

t he s ev e n c ha kr a s
chological, emotional, and spiritual needs; they are all the same. For
example, in this energetic body system model, spirituality is an inher-
ent biological need, just as biological needs for food and fluid, elimina-
tion, and ventilation are inherently spiritual (Myss 1996).
Perhaps within this non-dual holographic integration of Wilber
and Myss (Four-Quadrant Model with Seven-Center Energetic Chakra
System), with respect to Caritas Nursing and basic needs we can envi-
sion chakras as what Wilber refers to as “lines” of development and
states of caring that transcend the quadrants, running through them.
Jarrin (2006) uses examples of such lines in nursing as:

• Roach’s Six Cs of Caring (Roach 2002)
• Watson’s Clinical Caritas Processes (Watson 2004a)
• Leininger’s Taxonomy of Caring Constructs (Leininger 1981).

Newman’s (1994) theory of health as expanding consciousness,
Rogers’s (1970) Unitary perspective, Boykin and Schoenhofer’s (2001)
ontological caring stance, and Watson’s (2002a, 2003, 2005, 2006)
transpersonal writings account for nonphysical, nonordinary states in
caring. Thus, different types of caring can include professional (nurs-
ing and non-nursing) as well as nonprofessional health care provid-
ers. Both lines and levels of nursing become types of caring as well
(Jarrin 2006). So, practices and practical programs that focus primar-
ily on body-system/disease frameworks can be seen as adequate tech-
nical practices, but they are incomplete with respect to professional
Caritas knowledge-driven practices. Such limited outer-world, right-
quadrant practice frameworks are incomplete and inadequate with
respect to notions of Caritas Nursing and a more mature disciplinary
Caring Science context.
If action is informed only by the right-sided quadrant objective
field, nursing can be and often is reduced to a task, an end in and of
itself. Likewise, the person/patient is reduced to the physical “case,”
to the moral status of object. As this slippery situation occurs, it allows
acts to be performed that are inconsistent with an ethic of caring that
honors the “face,” the whole person. For example, if another human
being is reduced to the moral status of object, one can begin to justify

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