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Macondo well, rig personnel identified three leaks on the stack prior to the
                             379
                   blowout.

                          The first leak was a “very small” leak on the control hose for the upper
                                                                            380
                   annular surge bottle that resulted from a loose fitting.   The leak was discovered
                   about two weeks after the Deepwater Horizon’s BOP stack was positioned on the
                                   381
                   Macondo well.   The second leak was in the lower annular; the crew never
                   determined where fluid was coming from but through testing ruled out a
                   number of components related to the annular.   The third leak was in the lower
                                                                    382
                   test ram arising from the one of the solenoids on the yellow pod.   The crew
                                                                                        383
                   function and pressure tested the BOP stack after these leaks were discovered and
                   those tests were successful.
                                                384

                          Mark Hay explained Transocean’s process for assessing leaks.  When a
                   leak is discovered, he said that “you would talk to the maintenance supervisor
                   and OIM and then you would do a risk assessment on the rig, and then the rig
                   team would make a decision, and you would give field support a call with your
                   findings, your leak rates and all that, and they would determine if it is deemed
                                                          385
                   necessary to pull and make repairs.”

                          BP noted the leak on the lower test ram in its internal daily operations
                                                             386
                   report from February 23 until March 13.   Despite identifying this leak, BP did
                   not take steps to ensure that Transocean reported that leak in the IADC drilling
                          387
                   report.   Transocean did not record the leak on the upper annular control hose
                   on the IADC drilling report.   BP’s John Guide did not believe the leak on the
                                                 388








                   379  Hay testimony at 242; Pleasant testimony at 113.  In addition, response personnel identified
                   BOP system leaks during efforts to shut the well in.  It is not known whether those leaks
                   developed post‐blowout or existed before the blowout and were not identified by the crew.
                   380  Hay testimony at 193‐194.
                   381  Id. at 244.
                   382  Id. at 193, 195.
                   383  Id. at 193‐194, 196.
                   384  Id. at 249.
                   385  Id. at 243.
                   386  BP’s Daily Operations Reports, 02/23/10 – 03/13/2010.
                   387  Id.
                   388  Id.


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