Page 39 - History of War - Issue 01-14

OPERATION MINCEMEAT

rejected and rewritten all over again. There Germans if carried in the way this document the notoriously big-headed General Montgomery:
was general agreement that, as Montagu had would be”. There was even a debate over how “Do you still take the same size in hats, or do
originally envisaged, the main plank of the to spell the Greek city Kalamata. The operation you need a couple of sizes larger, like Monty?”
deception should be a personal letter from seemed to be running into a swamp of detail. That, too, was censored. Finally, Montagu
Lt General Sir Archibald Nye [Vice Chief of the Typically, Montagu tried to insert some tongue- managed to squeeze a tiny half-joke in at the
Imperial General Staff] to General Sir Harold in-cheek jokes into the letter. He wanted Nye end, relating to Montgomery’s much-mocked
Alexander [Commander of British forces in the to write: “I wonder whether you could ask one habit of issuing orders every day. “What is wrong
eastern part of the Mediterranean]. It was also of your ADCs to send me a case of oranges with Monty? He hasn’t issued an order of the
agreed that the letter should identify Greece as or lemons. One misses fresh fruit terribly, day for at least 48 hours.” That stayed in, for now.
Montagu’s temper, never slow to ignite, began
IT WAS AGREED THAT THE LETTER SHOULD IDENTIFY GREECE smouldering dangerously as the deadline neared
and the key letter was tweaked and poked,
AS THE TARGET OF THE NEXT ALLIED ASSAULT. BEYOND THIS, polished and moulded. Page after page of drafts
went into the fi les, covered with Montagu’s
THERE WAS VERY LITTLE AGREEMENT ABOUT ANYTHING AT ALL increasingly enraged squiggles and remarks.
Finally, the Chiefs of Staff came up with a
good suggestion: why not have General Nye
draft the letter himself, since this would be “the
the target of the next Allied assault, and Sicily especially this time of year when there is really best way of giving it an authentic touch”? Archie
as the cover target. Beyond this, there was very nothing to buy.” The Chiefs of Staff excised this: Nye was no wordsmith, but he knew General
little agreement about anything at all. General Nye could not be made to look like Alexander fairly well, and he knew the sound of
Almost everyone who read the letter thought a scrounger. Even to the Germans. Especially his own voice. Nye read all the earlier drafts,
it could do with “alteration and improvement”. to the Germans. So Montagu tried another then put the letter into his own words. The key
Everyone from the Twenty Committee to the line: “How are you getting on with Eisenhower? passage referred to General Sir Henry “Jumbo”
Chiefs of Staff had a different idea about how I gather he is not bad to work with…” That was Wilson, then Commander-in-Chief of the Middle
to achieve this. The Admiralty thought it needed also removed: too fl ippant for a General. Next, East, making it appear that he would be
to be “more personal”. The Air Ministry insisted Montagu attempted a quip at the expense of spearheading an attack on Greece; it indicated,
the letter should indicate that the bombing of
Sicilian airfi elds was in preparation for invading
Greece, and not a prelude to an attack on Sicily
itself. The Chief of the Imperial General Staff
and Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff, General
Sir Alan Brooke, wanted “a letter in answer to
one from General Alexander”. The Director of
Plans thought the operation “should not be
undertaken earlier than two months before the
real operation”, in case the real plans changed.
Bevan wondered whether the draft letter
sounded “too offi cial”, and insisted, “We must
get Dudley Clarke’s approval as it’s his theatre.”
Clarke himself, in a fl urry of cables from Algiers,
warned of the “danger of overloading this
communication”, and stuck to the view that it was
“a mistake to play for high deception stakes”.
Bevan remained anxious: “If anything
miscarries and the Germans appreciate that
the letter is a plant, they would no doubt realise
that we intend to attack Sicily.” Clarke framed
his own draft, further enraging Montagu, who
regarded this effort as “merely a lowish-grade
innuendo at the target of the type that has
often been, and could always be, put over by
a double agent”. The Director of Plans agreed
that “Mincemeat should be capable of much
greater things”. Bevan then also tried his hand
at a letter, which again Montagu dismissed as Mary Evans
“of a type which could’ve been sent by signal Fake naval identity card of Major
William Martin.
and would not have appeared genuine to the

30 2 9 19 4 7 10

APRIL 1943 MAY 1943 MAY 1943 MAY 1943 JUNE 1943 JUNE 1943 JULY 1943
Seraph reaches the Major Martin is buried Karl-Erich Kuhlenthal Adolf Hitler holds a Major Martin’s death The Hotel St George Allied forces
southern coast of in Huelva. His funeral rushes to Berlin to military conference, is reported by The in Algiers hosts invade Sicily in
Spain, near the port is attended by a present his superior in which he refers to Times newspaper, a conference, at Operation Husky.
of Huelva. Here, group of mourners, commanders with his the expected Allied in a move designed which Churchill and

the body of Major both official and “discovery” in Major assault on Greece. to further deceive General Eisenhower

Martin is dropped unofficial. His death Martin’s briefcase. German intelligence. finalise plans for an

into the sea. It is certificate cites invasion of Sicily.
“drowning” as the
later discovered by “drowning” as the
later discovered b
y

local fisherman José cause of his demise.
local fi
osé
cause of his demise.
man J

sher
Antonio Rey Maria.
Antonio Rey Maria.
HISTORY WAR 39
HISTORY
of
HoW01.Operation Mincemeat.indd 39 30/01/2014 16:29