Page 88 - AirForces Monthly - Issue 381 (December 2019)

Attrition
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Report into fatal Red

Arrows crash released

A SERVICE Inquiry Panel report
into the fatal crash of Royal Air
Force Red Arrows Hawk T1A
XX204 at RAF Valley, Anglesey,
on March 20, 2018 (see Attrition,
May 2018, p92) was published
by the Ministry of Defence on
October 10. The pilot, Flt Lt
David Stark, callsign ‘Red 3’
(R3), ejected 0.5 seconds before
impact. The ‘Circus’ (Red Arrows
ground crew) engineer in the back
seat, Corporal Jonathan Bayliss,
did not eject and was killed.
The crash occurred at 1325hrs,
after the aircraft had departed RAF
Valley to conduct a practice engine
failure after take-off (PEFATO)
before transiting to RAF Scampton,
Lincolnshire. On departure, R3 Red Arrows Hawk T1 XX242 during a training sortie at RAF Scampton. A
was given take-off clearance at report into the crash of sister aircraft XX204 was published by the MOD on
1322hrs for an approach back to October 10. MOD Crown Copyright/Cpl Steve Buckley
the duty runway for the PEFATO. advanced to maximum and roll and subsequent positioning led to factors may have influenced R3
After take-off, and on passing inputs applied to level the wings, the aircraft being low and laterally and contributed to the accident.
approximately 255ft (78m) and at indicating an intent to go-around. close to the runway. During the The panel determined that,
257kts, the aircraft commenced a Coincident with the application of final turn the high AOB and nose when considered collectively, it
right turn. Having turned through full power, the aircraft experienced down pitch to maintain speed led was very likely that R3 was, to a
36° and at circa 450ft (137m) and a roll reversal and distinct right to an excessive rate of descent/ degree, fatigued and distracted
278kts, R3 initiated a PEFATO. He wing drop; the aircraft’s speed was flight path angle which required during the flight, and may have
transmitted to air traffic control 146.7kts. During the subsequent increased application of g resulting had reduced situational awareness.
(ATC) that he had a simulated three seconds, applications in a reduced stall margin. The The panel assessed that distraction
engine failure and was positioning of full left aileron and full aft flight profile was such that the stall may have directly influenced
for ‘low key’ (a virtual position control column were made, and was coincident with the go-around his actions in the application of
within the ATC visual circuit abeam a further wing drop experienced. rather than as a consequence of a high AOB and, at the critical
the intended landing point) to Approximately 4.7 seconds after the it; the panel could not establish if moment of the sortie, he may not
runway 31. XX204 achieved a initiation of the go-around and with R3 had any perceptible indications have recognised the associated
maximum height on the downwind 15° right AOB, an essentially level of the stall. Flight test analysis hazards. It was not possible
leg of approximately 1,400ft (427m) pitch attitude and at 151kts, the corroborated extant warnings to determine the categorical
above ground level (AGL) and a aircraft hit the ground, immediately regarding stalling related to reason why R3 flew the profile
speed of 183kts. R3 reported low prior to which the pilot had ejected; the Hawk and demonstrated he did. In the panel’s opinion,
key when downwind and parallel the engineer did not eject. that, at low speed/low energy, there was no single factor that
to a position about halfway down During the impact sequence, stall margins were minimal. underpinned his decisions/actions.
the runway and, seven seconds the aircraft caught fire and the The panel concluded that the While the training provided
later, began a gradual final right fuselage and wing separated. lack of continuation training (CT), Circus engineers with an
turn towards the runway from There was substantial structural specifically PEFATO/practice enhanced level of preparation
around 1,030ft (314m) and 183kts. damage to the forward part of forced landing currency, could for their role, with regards to a
About halfway around the final the fuselage and a severe fire result in skill fade. Nevertheless, passenger, there was insufficient
turn, just as the undercarriage around the cockpit area. The the frequency of CT and the evidence for the panel to assess
locked down, ATC prompted R3 aircraft wreckage was spread aircraft’s flight profile do not whether any training would have
for confirmation that his landing over an area approximately 164ft solely explain why the accident prepared XX204’s engineer to
gear was down, to which he (50m) wide by 656ft (200m) long. happened, as at any stage R3 independently recognise the
immediately replied: “Red 3 The panel concluded that the could have terminated the exercise need to eject during the accident
gear down”. ATC then issued accident was caused by the by initiating a go-around. R3 sequence. R3 ejected 0.5 sec
clearance for a low approach, aircraft stalling coincident with was an above average qualified before XX204 crashed following
which R3 read back; there were the initiation of the go-around flying instructor who had flown the dramatic realisation that the
no further radio transmissions and with insufficient height to PEFATOs on multiple occasions, aircraft would hit the ground. The
between the aircraft and ATC. recover. However, there were a albeit not in the immediate panel assessed that there was
At around 345ft (105m), with an series of aspects that collectively period prior to the accident. insufficient time for him to issue
increasing rate of descent (ROD) contributed to XX204’s flight profile He was suitably qualified and a complete verbal warning and
and having crossed through the and culminated in the stall. The experienced to fly the manoeuvre, for the engineer to recognise the
runway centreline, the throttle was timing of the PEFATO initiation although a series of human command and react appropriately.

86 // December 2019 #381 www.Key.Aero

86-89 Attrition AFM Dec2019.indd 86 11/11/2019 11:20:44