Page 103 - Towards Trustworthy Elections New Directions in Electronic Voting by Ed Gerck (auth.), David Chaum, Markus Jakobsson, Ronald L. Rivest, Peter Y. A. Ryan, Josh Benaloh, Miroslaw Kutylowski, Ben Adida ( (z-lib.org (1)

voters [12]. These receipts cannot prove what the voter voted on, but they can
prove that the vote is included in the tally. These receipts can help inspire
confidence in the entire process, showing voters that their vote was included in
the final tally. A Secure Architecture for Voting Electronically (SAVE) 95
In addition, the inclusion of witness modules written by political parties and
interest groups enables voters to see that votes were cast during valid voting
periods and helps reduce post-voting litigation due to accusations of ’stuffing
the ballot box.’
7 Conclusions

Paper balloting presents myriad opportunities for defrauding the election process,
and VVPT that have a legal preference over electronic systems retain the same
possibility for manipulation. VVPT systems also present the opportunity to sow
confusion amongst election officials and voters as to which result is actually valid.
Three different versions of SAVE systems have been written by students at
MIT. These systems have been implemented as C++ and Java, and coded
independently.
Whereas paper has no cryptographic security, electronic systems enable a
better way of ensuring the validity and privacy of ballots. By creating systems
with n-version programming, failures from denial of service attacks, nefarious
vendors and malicious poll workers can be mitigated.
The SAVE system takes the existing reliability of electronic voting systems
and adds resilience to both internal failures and malicious attack. The greater
the diversity achieved in the modules, the greater the protection from failure.
As always, cost is a factor, but as a modular architecture, SAVE systems should
be easy to build, understand and validate.

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