Page 136 - Towards Trustworthy Elections New Directions in Electronic Voting by Ed Gerck (auth.), David Chaum, Markus Jakobsson, Ronald L. Rivest, Peter Y. A. Ryan, Josh Benaloh, Miroslaw Kutylowski, Ben Adida ( (z-lib.org (1)

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enough electoral authority is inept or involved. Labeling such considerations as
“paranoia” or “conspiracy theory” will not make these facts go away; rather, such ad-
hominem rhetoric signals that the extrication of those two senses of security is prereq-
uisite for a thorough, balanced analysis of the e-voting modernization phenomena.
But the persistence of such ad-hominem rhetoric, specially by the mainstream media
in chorus with the discourse of electoral officials and suppliers, also yields a construc-
tive reading. It reminds us that collusion strategies can, of course, start with obfusca-
tion of main motives for certain choices in the design and procurement of voting
systems, in tandem with lobby for electoral regulation reform to legitimize them. If
so, such strategies need to drive those two senses of security to appear indistinguish-
able, or inseparable. From there, to a collusion's full feast is an easy ride: through the
disguising of the second sense of security as the first, say, as an inevitable conse-
quence of technological progress.
Thus, the security of legitimate interests in representative democracies, at least in
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democracies bound to preserve the spirit of its humanist revival , ought to be sought
by fully acknowledging and considering not only risks of collusion, but also the ensu-
ing profile of risks and how this profile can change with changes in the electoral proc-
esses and in voter mentality. And not to be sought by unilateral control of the process,
be it by the market's invisible hand or any other, or through jealously guarded secrets
of its mechanisms, which over-empower the beholders.
For its part, adequate protection against collusions can only be achieved with ade-
quate balance between transparency of the (electoral) subprocesses and distribution of
their controls among legitimate and potentially conflicting interests, integrated in a
way to allow for an effective oversight. In electoral processes, or in any other process
intrinsically exposed to the risk of collusions, the more technological intermediation
there is the more such balance will hinge on two basic elements: Carefully tailored
regulation, and participation of stakeholders (voters) in the oversight process.
This is of the utmost importance for elections, due to two main thrusts. First, the
risk of collusions as a constant menace to representative democracy, due to its delicate
political nature. Second, technological intermediation as a wedge, parting voters from
autonomous oversight roles and, ultimately, risking their role as democracy's guaran-
tors of last resort. In our view, backed by the empirical evidence given here, inconsis-
tent voting system requirements can lock these two risks in positive feedback. And in
our times, there seems to be nothing more effective for this than the requirements of
vote secrecy and of vote dematerialization through complete computerization.
For historical evidence, on the first thrust we cite the comprehensive research
by John Fund published in 2004 [15], regarding the U.S., the nation with yet the
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most successful case of democratic rule . And on the second, plus empirical evi-
dence on how these two thrusts may feedback, we offer the last sessions, regard-
ing Brazil, a hesitant latecomer to democratic rule. On feedback signs we pick
some from a collective spell of supposed technological prowess Brazil seems to

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From the French and the American Revolutions of the Eighteen Century.
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At least in the sense of being the nation with the longest continuous period of democratic
rule.