Page 68 - Towards Trustworthy Elections New Directions in Electronic Voting by Ed Gerck (auth.), David Chaum, Markus Jakobsson, Ronald L. Rivest, Peter Y. A. Ryan, Josh Benaloh, Miroslaw Kutylowski, Ben Adida ( (z-lib.org (1)

A. Juels, D. Catalano, and M. Jakobsson
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Chong, and Myers [16] have devised and implemented a refined protocol in a system
called Civitas, and achieved good scalability by partitioning the population of voters. It
is certainly conceivable that there exists a provably secure, coercion-resistant electronic
voting scheme with lower complexity—perhaps even linear. Constructing one remains
an open problem.
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