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A Remark on Strong Verifiability

We set forth our definitions of correctness and verifiability in the body of the paper to
meet the minimal requirements for a fair election and to achieve some measure of con-
ceptual simplicity. These definitions are adequate for most election scenarios, but have a
technical deficiency that may be of concern in some cases. In particular, our definitions
allow for the possibility that a voter controlled by A casts a ballot corresponding to vote
β, but that the ballot gets counted as a vote for β .Since A can choose the vote cast by a

controlled voter in any case, this technical deficiency only means that A can potentially
cause the votes of controlled voters only to change in the midst of the election process. It