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106 Johan Saravanamuttu

274) shows that overall, only 39 per cent of Malays voted for the BN in Malay-majority
seats. e caution here is that the BN’s vote share includes votes from non-Malays;
nonetheless, the slippage since 2013, when BN won 52 per cent, is considerable. See
also Su an and Lee’s chapter in this volume, which suggests an overall gure of 22 per
cent of Malays’ support for PH.
5 Malaysia’s rst-past-the-post (FPTP) system had regularly given manufactured
majorities to the BN. In the 2013 general election, that system conferred victory on BN
with about 47 per cent of the popular vote. is time around, PH is the bene ciary of
the FPTP system.
6 I draw from my account of events in Saravanamuttu 2016: 243–66.
7 e ‘Kajang move’ occurred after the party had ousted its own Selangor Menteri
Besar (Chief Minister) Khalid Ibrahim on grounds that he was nancially beholden
to UMNO. Anwar sought to lead the state. A court case disquali ed Anwar from the
Kajang contest. Wan Azizah stood in his place and duly won the seat. However, PAS
objected to her becoming menteri besar. After a convoluted sequence of events, PKR
deputy president Azmin Ali emerged as menteri besar with PAS support and the all-
important approval of the Selangor sultan.
8 e bill would have allowed for sharia punishments to be raised to a maximum term
of 30 years’ imprisonment, a RM100,000 ne, and 100 lashes of the whip.
9 e term had come to be used to depict moderates, supposedly based on Turkish
politics.
10 See Saravanamuttu 2016: 246–47 for an account of the impact of the 61st Muktamar.
11 e Wall Street Journal (2016) revised the gure to over US$1 billion.
12 e Bumiputera Economic Empowerment Programme (BEEP) launched in 2013
was criticised as a measure to appease the Malay right-wing group Perkasa (Malaysiakini
2013). See also Lee 2013.
13 Space does not allow for a full rendering of the complex web of FGV controversies
that have implications for thousands of FELDA smallholder families who have been
loyal UMNO voters. For an analysis of FGV’s woes and their relevance to shifting
political dynamics, see Khor 2015 and Maznah 2015.
14 Politweet predicted the probable result to be 23 seats for BN, 15 DAP, 14 PKR,
and 10 PAS, without Bersatu and Amanah’s having been factored in yet. e study is
available at https://politweet.wordpress.com/2016/11/09/the-impact-of-redelineation-
on-the-selangor-state-elections/ [accessed 10 January 2018].
15 Interviews conducted during the campaign period with politicians on both sides of
the divide indicated that BN’s campaign assiduously avoided using Najib’s name; his
image was also noticeably absent from BN posters.
16 I reached this conclusion through interviews during the campaign period in early
May 2018 with PAS leaders in Terengganu and Kelantan and also from conversations
with Amanah leaders in the two states. Interviews were with Ahmad Shamsuri (PAS),
Ahmad Amzad (PAS), Husam Musa (Amanah), and Raja Kamarul Bahrin (Amanah).
17 is insight comes from conversations with research assistants who were located in
the two states during the election period.

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