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162                 Ahmad Fauzi Abdul Hamid and Che Hamdan Che Mohd Razali

                  mobilization on the part of Malay-Muslim ethnocrats from both UMNO and
                  PAS to galvanize the Malay masses into defending what they perceive as their
                  inalienable birthright (Harakah Daily 2018; Malaysiakini 2018c; Syed Jaymal
                  2018).  ose pressures make it all the more important that PH tread its path
                  carefully and  nd new ways to promote its civic-nationalist vision without
                  stoking Malay-Muslims’ fears, lest concerned Malaysians’ hard-earned GE14
                  triumph be derailed when it has still yet barely begun.


                  Notes
                  1    is study is based on interviews and participant-observation of campaigning
                  during GE14.  e discussion is restricted to Peninsular Malaysia and excludes Sabah
                  and Sarawak due to the limited resources available to the researchers. We presented
                  preliminary  ndings at seminars at the Institute of Malaysian and International Studies
                  (IKMAS) and the Institute of Ethnic Studies (KITA), Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia,
                  on 16 May 2018 and 1 June 2018, respectively.
                  2    is term refers to the puritanical stream pioneered by Muhammad ibn Abd al-
                  Wahhab (1703–92) of Nejd in the Arabian Peninsula.  e school’s advent in Malaysia
                  is fairly recent, powered by Saudi petro-dollars amassed following the Organisation
                  of Petroleum Exporting Countries’ oil crises of 1973–74—a period coinciding with
                  the rudimentary phases of Islamic revival in Malaysia. Historically, reform-oriented
                  Malay-Muslims have been more familiar with the version of Sala sm imported from
                  the Al-Manar school of Egypt, as expounded by Jamal al-din Al-Afghani (1838–97),
                  Muhammad Abduh (1849–1905) and Rasyid Rida (1865–1935). But expanding Saudi
                  in uence in the Muslim world has brought a marriage of sorts between Sala sm in
                  general and its more rigid Wahhabi version, including in Malaysia. For details, see
                  Ahmad Fauzi 2016 and Maszlee 2017b.
                  3   Literally meaning ‘limits’,  hudud are scripturally mandated criminal punishments
                  following convictions in sharia courts. Examples are amputation of the hand for thieves,
                  eighty lashes’  ogging for libel and one hundred lashes for fornication, and stoning to
                  death for adultery.
                  4   Malaysia has nine hereditary Malay Rulers who rotate among themselves every  ve
                  years to become the Yang diPertuan Agong, the federation’s constitutional monarch.  e
                  Rulers are themselves sultans of their respective states. Each of the remaining four states
                  without Rulers—Penang, Malacca, Sabah, and Sarawak—has a Yang diPertua Negeri,
                  or governor, as its titular head. Together, the thirteen heads of state make up the Majlis
                  Raja-raja (Conference of Rulers).
                  5   A few months later, in May 2017, Kamarul Zaman lodged a police report against
                  Selangor state assembly speaker Hannah  Yeoh of DAP for allegedly propagating
                  Christianity through her book, Becoming Hannah: A Personal Journey (Sinar Harian
                  2017).
                  6   Interview with Dato’ Dr Ahmad Farouk Musa, Kuala Lumpur, 25 March 2017.







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