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Islam and Its Racial Dynamics in Malaysia’s 14th General Election 161

between a civic-territorial ideal and an ethnic-Malay genealogical vision
(Loh 2017). Not least given BN’s e orts to secure Malay-Muslim loyalties
by raising racial and religious bogeys, GE14’s extraordinary denouement has
brought to the forefront debates over what type of nation-state Malaysians
desire: an inclusive civic nation or an ethnocracy driven by identity politics
(Alagappa 2018).
It would be naive to think that through GE14, by changing a regime
that had long thrived upon the ethno-religious sentiments of a Malay-
Muslim community bombarded daily with state-manufactured fears of being
overwhelmed economically and politically by their non-Malay countrymen,
racial and religious politics would correspondingly disappear. As lawyer
Syahredzan Johan, also the political secretary to long-time DAP supremo Lim
Kit Siang, noted, in telling his boss that the majority of Malay-Muslim votes
still eluded PH, changing the government was much easier than reforming
‘mindsets, cultures and deep seated prejudices’ (Chong 2018). What happened
on 9 May 2018 was a convergence of interests among a majority of non-Malays
and just enough Malays to bring down the kleptocratic regime of BN-UMNO
under Najib Razak. GE14 saw the coming together of three forces that together
su ced to vanquish BN at last: a pro-Reformasi Anwar Ibrahim wave, a pro-
Mahathir wave, and an anti-Najib Razak wave. Given that none of these forces
directly addresses the Islamist fears UMNO and PAS seem determined to
elevate ever further, PH’s victory could well prove a one-o a air.
GE14’s historic outcome was not an emphatic endorsement of progressive
reforms that many Malay-Muslims see as ‘liberal’, which might herald a new
openness in socio-political interaction, and which might threaten the religio-
cultural values Malay-Muslims hold dear, and whose entrenchment con rms
the community’s grip over the country’s institutional and political make-up. If
the PH government cannot reassure Malay-Muslim voters that it will protect
their interests, the coalition risks losing what support it has from Malaysia’s
majority racial and religious group. Such an eventuality is a recipe for political
short-termism. Within months of the polls, worries were being openly
expressed at the brashness with which ‘liberal’ elements in PH were pushing
through their agenda. Even Anwar Ibrahim soon warned against ‘super-liberal’
elements out to hijack his moderate Reformasi agenda—a programme that
respects Malaysia’s Malay-Muslim and Islamic ethos ( e Star Online 2018).
Statements by Dr Mahathir Mohamad amounting to placating Malay-
Muslim concerns over the whittling away of privileges previously accorded to
them can be read in a similar light (FMT Reporters 2018; Augustin 2018).
Before the dust had fully settled, reports started to emerge indicating intense

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