Page 49 - NS-2 Textbook

42 MARITIME HISTORY

for a victory. In the first place, neither side expected a Lincoln's inunediate response ,vas to begin a naval
prolonged war. The South thought the North would blockade of all Southern ports from the Virginia Capes to
quickly tire of casualties and war expenses. It also be- Texas. Davis figured that Lincoln's action would so anger
lieved Northern politics to be so unstable that the Union the British and French merchants and textile businesses
would never be able to fight as one unit. The border that foreign privateers would be attracted to the South-
states-Maryland, Delaware, Kentucky, and Missouri- ern cause, tempted by the great profits that could be
while remaining in the Union, were at least partially made. Second, he believed that this would eventually
sympathetic to the Confederate cause. For example, they force the British and French to at least recognize and as-
supported both sides with troops. sist the South, if not openly join it as allies.
TI,e Southern leadership had no idea of the economic Davis was wrong on both scores. Both British and
demands of modern "war~ so it \vas not able to foresee its French shipyards built fast schooners and cruisers for the
battlefield needs. One very important belief in the South South to use as blockade numers, but they observed the
was that the Northern blockade would cut off "King Cot- Union blockade themselves. Trade with the North was
ton" from British and French markets, forcing those far more important to them than trade with the South.
cDlmtries to help the Southern cause for econon1ic rea- Furthermore, in addition to ne\v sources of cotton in
sons. This proved to be a vain hope, though there was Egypt and India, the Europeans already had huge inven-
much sympathy for the South in Europe. When exports tories of raw cotton from the 1860 crop. Davis undoubt-
of cotton from the South dwindled, Europeans turned to edly would have helped the Confederate cause much
alternative sources of supply in Egypt and india. more if he had tried to ship out all the cotton he could be-
In spite of these handicaps, howevel; the South had fore the Union blockade could become effective. This
some undeniable strengths. Key among these was the might have built up some cash reserves for purchasing
high quality of its officer corps, most of the finest of war materials that could have been smuggled in by
whom had recently worn the blue Imiform. Also, the blockade flumers.
South was a vast territmy, not easily invaded or held by Proclaiming a blockade and making one effective are
anything other than a large and expensive army. Finally, two different things, however. When Lincoln gave his
the majority of Southerners were very loyal to the Con- Navy the task, he had three ships in commission in home
federate cause, a fact that gave the Southern leaders waters to blockade and patrol 3,550 nllies of Confederate
much comfort and enabled them to fight on against great coast ·with 189 harbors and navigable river mouths.
odds. For a comparison of the assets of the North and Gideon Welles, Lincoln's secretary of the navy, was a
South, and the advantage the North had over the South man ·who tmderstood naval administration and the role
at the start of the Civil War, see table below. of the Navy. He began a shipbuilding program and
bought and adapted many vessels of the American
merchant marine. By December 1861, Welles had 264 ves-
NAVY ROLE: BLOCKADE
sels in conunission and had established an adequate
When the war started, Jefferson Davis knew that the blockade off all the major cotton ports: Wilmington,
South must get help abroad. In order to force the eco- North Carolina; Charleston; Savarmah; Pensacola;
nomic issues, he authorized privateering on 17 April, Mobile; Galveston; and the entrances to the Mississippi
granting letters of marque to ships of any nation that River.
would prey on Northern shipping. He also declared an Every kind of ship, tugboat, and even paddle-wheel
embargo on cotton, keeping it in the South in the hope ferryboat ·was cormnissioned, equipped with one or hvo
that prices would rise for later sale to blockade rwmers. guns, and staked out along the Southern coast. They
quickly stopped Confederate coastal shipping and made
privateering and blockade running a hazardous busi-
ness. Crews ·were recruited from every walk of life and
often put to sea without any h·aining. However, in most
North (%) sOllth (%)
ships, career men or nlerchant mariners served as a nu-
cleus of trained men, and they quickly whipped the new
Population 71 29
111en into shape. Men learned fast ,vhen they \vere under
Wealth produced 75 25
Farm acreage 65 35 shore-battery fire, and they were kept busy trying to stop
enemy blockade rulmers tlu'oughout most of the war.
Value of crops 70 30
Railroad mileage 72 28 TI,e expansion of the blockade, however, presented
one problem. The farther from Union territory the ships
Factories 85 15
lvere, the 11lore dependent on coal and other supplies
Iron production 96 4
Bank deposits 81 19 they became. Consequently, a plan was developed to es-
tablish a series of bases at sh'ong points along the Con-