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2.    Float Collar Conversion Attempts


                          On April 18, at approximately 3:30 a.m., the Deepwater Horizon crew
                   started running the 9‐7/8 x 7 inch long string production casing and finished the
                   procedure at 1:30 p.m. on April 19.   After the casing string landed, the crew
                                                        117
                   attempted to convert the float collars in preparation for pumping production
                   casing cement into the well.  Based on information that Weatherford supplied,
                   the float collar conversion should have occurred with a differential pressure of
                   between 400 and 700 pounds per square inch (psi), which required a calculated
                   pump rate of five to seven barrels per minute (bpm).  A successful conversion of
                   the float collar would result in the float collar’s two check valves moving into a
                   closed position, which should prevent flow of cement (or other fluids) up the
                   casing.

                          The crew made nine attempts to establish circulation through the float
                   collar in an effort to convert the float collar, increasing pressure on each attempt.
                   The crew finally established circulation on the ninth try, at pressure of 3,142 psi.
                   After circulation was established, the circulation pressure was only 340 psi,
                   which was lower than the pressure of 570 psi predicted by Halliburton’s
                   computer model.  The pump rate required to move mud into the well and
                   through the shoe track (circulating pressure) never exceeded approximately 4
                   bpm, which was less than the five to seven bpm that Weatherford determined
                   was necessary for float collar conversion.

                          Because Bob Kaluza, the BP well site leader, was concerned about the low
                   circulating pressure, he directed the rig crew to switch circulating pumps to
                   determine whether doing so would improve circulating pressure.  They
                   eventually concluded that the pressure gauge they had been relying on was
                   inaccurate.
                               118

                          Nathaniel Chaisson, an onsite Halliburton engineer, testified that, after
                   circulation was established, Kaluza said “I’m afraid that we’ve blown something
                   higher up in the casing joint.”  Chaisson understood Kaluza to mean that he
                   believed they had not been circulating mud from the bottom of the well up, but


                   117  BP Daily Drilling reports 4/19, 4/10 (BP‐HZN‐MBI‐000136936; BP‐HZN‐MBI‐000136946).
                   118  Cocales testimony at 71‐75.


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