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rather were circulating it from some point higher in the well casing. According
to notes of Kaluza’s interview with BP internal investigators, Kaluza discussed
with Guide and Keith Daigle, a BP well operations advisor, what Kaluza
considered to be the anomaly of the low circulation pressure after circulation was
established. In that conversation, Guide directed Kaluza to pump cement and
did not instruct him to redo tests or to take any other precautions (for example,
setting another cement barrier on top of the wiper plug or more closely
120
monitoring well flows and pressures after completion of the cement job).

Despite Kaluza’s misgivings about low circulating pressure, the BP team
on the Deepwater Horizon concluded that the float valves had in fact converted
and therefore continued to the cement pumping phase of the temporary
abandonment operation.

3. Problems with Float Collar Conversion

The cementing crew believed that the float valves converted and,
therefore, proceeded to pump cement into the well, even though there was
evidence that the conversion never occurred. Without proper conversion of the
float collar, cement and other fluids would have a path to flow back up the
casing to the rig floor. Following the blowout, BP contracted Stress Engineering
to conduct a post‐incident analysis on float collars similar to that used on the
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Macondo well. Stress Engineering’s report concluded that the well
“experienced a blockage that prevented the float collar from converting during
steady state flow.” Data analyzed by Stress Engineering supported the
122
likelihood that a blockage was present from as early as when the diverter was
closed using the Allamon ball, up through BP’s final attempt to convert the float
123
collar. Stress Engineering could not determine whether the blockage occurred
at the float collar or at the reamer shoe.
124

119 Nathaniel Chaisson testimony at 432‐433.
120 BP‐HZN‐MBI00021271.
121 Horizon Incident Float Collar Study‐Analysis, Stress Engineering Services, November 22, 2010
(BP‐HZN‐MBI00262898).
122 Id.
123 Id.
124 The float collar and the reamer shoe were the two likely locations for blockage because they
each have flow‐directed ports that can become blocked with lost circulation material or other
debris. The reamer shoe ports can also become plugged as they are lowered into the hole. When
lowered, the shoe ports can scrape against the open hole section, which can force debris into the
shoe ports and clog them. BP’s Brian Morel told BP investigators that he believed at the time of
the attempted float collar conversion that the reamer shoe was plugged. BP‐HZN‐MBI00021304.

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