Page 68 - History of War - Issue 25-16
P. 68

BRIEFING

                                                                                      Israeli soldiers in
          Yom Kippur War                                                              atop their tank
                                                                                      Golan Heights stand




          The 1973 Arab-Israeli war may have lasted only 20

          days, but it violently shifted the balance of power in
                         the Middle East region forever

                                       WORDSMARWANKAMEL
                  hen Israel launched a surprise  was named Operation Badr, after the battle in
                  attack in 1967 that destroyed  which the Prophet Muhammad’s army returned
          WSyria and Egypt’s military capacity  to Mecca and seized it from the pagan Quraysh.
          and effectively tripled the country in size, it  Despite this careful planning, Israel became
          was sure that it had clearly demonstrated its  aware of the attack beforehand through its
          overwhelming, pre-emptive military capability  intelligence sources. However, the reports
          to shift power. While Syria lost two-thirds of its  were not taken seriously because a top, and
          ighting capacity in material and Egypt most of  suspect, Mossad agent named Ashraf Marwan
          its air force and a signiicant number of tanks,  – former Egyptian President Gamal Abdel
          the Six-Day War earned Israel huge territorial  Nasser’s son-in-law – had previously given a
          gains. Jordan was ejected from Jerusalem and  mistaken date for the attack of May 1973.
          the West Bank, and Sinai was taken from Egypt  Meanwhile, US policy sought to avoid conlict
          and the Golan Heights from Syria. Crucially,  altogether and Henry Kissinger convinced the
          Egypt also lost control of the Suez Canal to  Israelis against using a irst-strike policy. He
          Israel, which erected a line of fortiications  also encouraged the Soviets to do the same
          along the east coast (the Bar Lev line) to secure  with their clients.
          and restart the low of Israeli shipping through  Nonetheless, the co-ordinated attack came on
          the Red Sea to the Mediterranean. In short, the  6 October 1973. The Egyptians chose the date
          defeat was a triumph for Israel, and equally as  according to when the tidal conditions would
          humiliating for the Arab nations, who signed the  be most favourable for crossing the canal. It
          ceaseire begrudgingly.               happened to also coincide with both the high
           So began the War of Attrition. Former  Jewish holiday of Yom Kippur and the tenth day
          journalist Mohamed Hassanein Heikal, who  of the Muslim holy month of Ramadan.
          would be appointed Egyptian minister of
          information in 1970, stated in 1969: “This  Initial success for Egypt and Syria
          course, which meets all the requirements and  In the irst few hours of the war, the Syrian
          necessities and is in harmony with logic and  and Egyptian armies achieved unprecedented
          nature – this main course to tip the balance  successes. Ariel Sharon, then an Israeli tank
          in our favour, or merely to adjust it is: to inlict  commander, commented: “These were soldiers
          a clear defeat on the Israeli Army in battle, in  who had been brought up on victories… It was
          one battle… I am not speaking of a battle on  a generation that had never lost. Now they were
          the scale of that of 5 June 1967 – a 5 June  in a state of shock.
          in reverse… Most likely 5 June will not be  At approximately 2pm on the irst day,
          repeated… In the coming battle, neither we nor  Egyptian President Anwar Sadat ordered his
          the enemy will be taken by surprise.”  troops across the canal. They crossed in rubber
           The rhetoric began to ramp up further in 1971  dinghies and landed on the opposite side,
          and 1972, and as tensions mounted, Syria  establishing a bridgehead. Immediately they
          and Egypt planned for an attack. They accrued  came up against a massive sand embankment,
          supplies, which they had implored the Soviet  which slowed their progress and meant they
          Union to provide in the wake of the devastating  could not advance their tanks deeper against
          1967 defeat. Both countries started gathering  Israeli defences and into Sinai.
          hidden masses of equipment along the oficial  Egyptian engineers used ladders to construct
          ceaseire line, called the Purple Line, between  bridges in an attempt to allow armour over the
          Syria and Israel. Jordan had lost its appetite  Israeli sand wall, while their fellow soldiers
          for war and feared further territorial losses, so  started to dig. The attack’s commander, Saad
          King Hussein opted not to participate. The plan  el Shazly, found this far too slow, and feared

                           5 October
                                                                      6 October
                                                 6 October
          THEBATTLE       Ashraf Marwan warns  Egypt and Syria begin their attack   The Israeli cabinet skips
          FORSINAI       Zvi Zamir of an imminent  with the intent of liberating the Sinai   prayers for an emergency
                                                                     morning Yom Kippur
                         Israeli intelligence chief
                                           Peninsula and Golan Heights, which
          ANDTHE        attack the following day at  during the Six-Day War. Syria crosses   meeting where they decide
                                            Israel occupied six years earlier
                        6pm. Unfortunately, after a
                                                                   to mobilise reservists, who
          GOLAN         previous false alarm, they  the Purple Line. The Egyptian air   comprise the bulk of the
                                                                       Israeli army.
                         fail to heed his warning.
                                             force jets cross Suez Canal.
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