Page 72 - History of War - Issue 25-16

BRIEFING

Israel was well aware of its perception in the
international community’s eye. As the Israeli
cabinet discussed the future of its operations
in Golan, Israeli prime minister Golda Meir
insisted that the army press into Syria’s Bashan
region. If the war had ended as the Israelis
began to shift a division to the Sinai front,
which could have taken as long as four days,
then Israel would have suffered a territorial loss
in the south and no gain in the north, which
would have been perceived as a defeat.
At the conclusion of the war, Meir spoke
in front of the Israeli Knesset and said: “The
war in which we are engaged began with a
concerted attack on two fronts. The aggressive
initiative afforded our enemies preliminary
achievements – but, thanks to the spirit and
strength of Israel’s Defense Army, which is
backed by the entire nation, the attack was
broken. The aggressors were thrown back.
Considerable portions of their forces were
destroyed, and the IDF broke through and
crossed the ceasei re lines. From holding
battles our forces went on to the offensive and
gained brilliant achievements.”
The Arab neighbours were also well aware of
their own perception. They had begun the war
in an attempt to restore not only lost territory
but also their dignity in the public eye after the
humiliating defeats of the 1967 war.
In Damascus and Cairo, however, it was the
military class that went to war. Civilians mostly
continued on with their daily lives and normal
routines. Information was slow to reach them
through heavily monitored media outlets, and
security services ensured that the chatter on Egyptian POWs return
the streets was centred on debates over the home following the
best restaurants or neighbourhood gossip ceasei re after the war
rather than political and military matters.
Both Anwar Sadat and Hafez al Assad
also delivered iery speeches in front of their
legislative assemblies declaring triumphant
action and brotherhood. But even within this
military class itself, there was considerable
disagreement. As the Israelis counterattacked,
Anwar Sadat refused to allow his troops to
withdraw to reinforce weaker positions, despite
the suggestions of his generals. He feared that
any reversal would be perceived as a retreat.
It was these seams and weak points, like the
gap between the two Egyptian armies on the
eastern bank of the canal, that the Israelis
were able to penetrate.
Additionally, some later speculated that
Anwar Sadat had intended to use the capture of
Suez as a mere bargaining chip to secure better
terms in negotiations with Israel. Syria intended
to save face at home as well. After ighting
ceased, Colonel Raik Halawi, whose infantry A bipartisan committee
brigade had collapsed and allowed the Israeli concerning the war meets
advance, was executed. However, the short war in Washington, DC, on 10
October 1973, just four
would have even broader consequences into
days after it began
the future than these.
23 October 24 October 25 October 28 October
Israel ignores the ceasei re and cuts off the Israeli forces ignore the new ceasei re and For 24 tense hours, the Israeli and Egyptian military
Cairo-Suez highway reaching the port of Adabia. move into the city of Suez, but are driven world teeters on the leaders General Aharon Yariv and
The Egyptian Third Army is under siege. The UN away by a small militia. 80 Israeli soldiers brink of war with two General Mohamed el-Gamasy
Security council responds by insisting on the are killed and 120 wounded. The Soviet great nuclear powers. meet in a tent to negotiate a new
ceasei re and dispatches UN observers in the Union reacts by threatening to send troops The UN issues resolution ceasei re. It is the i rst meeting
region. The new ceasei re starts at 7am the to support the Egyptians while US responds 340, its third in less than between military reps from both
following day. by putting nuclear forces on alert. four days. countries in 25 years.

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