Page 144 - Towards Trustworthy Elections New Directions in Electronic Voting by Ed Gerck (auth.), David Chaum, Markus Jakobsson, Ronald L. Rivest, Peter Y. A. Ryan, Josh Benaloh, Miroslaw Kutylowski, Ben Adida ( (z-lib.org (1)

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Fig. 2. 1987 advertisement: "Without it, life would be hell”

To exemplify, we cite two impressive signs. One, the continuing veto by TSE of
requests to allow for independent homologation procedures, prescribed by well-
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established technical standards for electronic information systems (such as the Interna-
tional Standard Organization), on Brazil's official voting system. Two, the suppression
of the only means by which voters could independently verify the tally, for any eventual
manipulation therein, in the bylaws for the 2006 elections: ballot reports, printed and
signed on paper by precinct officials at the end of voting period, shallhenceforth not be
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handed out to more than “one representative of the political parties” .
The alleged explanation for the first of these signs, for the shutdown of doors to in-
dependent homologation, is the self-serving argument that electoral bylaws (written by
the system operators themselves) do not prescribe such tests. The only tests allowed,
labeled as audit, as oversight or as independent homologation to suit the occasion, are

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Among signs of this revelation we can cite: a dogmatic contamination of technical studies on
the security of Brazil's electronic voting system, ordered and paid for by Brazil's main elec-
toral authority -- TSE --, such as the 2002 report "from Unicamp" in light of an independent
analysis of the 2000 setup.bat file [see refs 6, 7 and 9]; a veto on the participation of Rebecca
Mercury in a scientific meeting on electronic v, sponsored by TSE and the University of
Santa Catarina in 2003, under the allegation that her views would have, according to a wit-
ness, "nothing to contribute to the betterment of our system"; a systematic refusal of TSE to
allow any independent homologation of the voting system, by voters or by technical assis-
tants to candidacies, not even as prescribed by national or international industrial or commer-
cial standards such as ISO's for Information Systems' Security.
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As per § II of Art. 42 of Resolution nº 22.154, issued by TSE on May 2006, later amended by
Resoluion nº 22.332, issued on August 8, 2006. Some state authorities, like São Paulo's
(through TRE-SP Instruction nº 12.523 of Sept. 22, 2006), have directed precinct officials at
the 2006 general election to ignore that late amendment, and thus, to deny printed ballot re-
ports to representatives of single political parties.