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Politics of Reform and the Triumph of Pakatan Harapan 91

consensus the Mahathir administration initiated. In spite of this challenge,
the post-Mahathir BN administrations of Abdullah Badawi and Najib Razak
failed to refurbish any high level of multiethnic consensus or to undertake
genuine reform agendas. Najib promoted his own 30-year vision with his plan
of National Transformation (TN50), which, while paying lip service to Vision
2020, e ectively scuttled it. As a multiethnic power-sharing arrangement,
BN was highly lopsided because of the dominance of UMNO and weak
non-Malay partners. It also relied heavily on its East Malaysian political
support. Najib’s 2010 New Economic Model (NEM), styled to moderate
features of the economy introduced under the New Economic Policy’s (NEP)
a rmative-action framework, failed to yield any real results, mainly because
Najib backtracked and within three years, reverted to NEP policies like the
Bumiputera Enterprise Empowerment Programme (BEEP).
e BN and development plans seemed to shift backstage as Najib
personalised his power through populist welfare-oriented policies and
programmes such as BR1M (Bantuan Rakyat 1Malaysia, 1Malaysia People’s
Aid) cash handouts, the aforementioned BEEP, and the Indian Blueprint
12
programme (Malaysiakini 2017a). e BR1M programme was the largest
ever direct cash-handout scheme ever implemented in Malaysia. Started in
2012, the programme rst paid a one-o RM500 payment to 80 per cent
of Malaysian households, amounting to a sum of RM2.6 billion, disbursed
to around 5.2 million households (BR1M 2016). By 2016, the programme
had bene ted 7.3 million recipients with a massive disbursement of RM5.4
billion. All households with incomes below RM3,000 monthly (increased to
RM4,000 in 2017) and unmarried adults earning less than RM2,000 were
eligible. Eligibility also extended to low-income senior citizens, single parents
with dependents, and married couples living with parents. By 2018, Najib’s
government pledged to pay up to RM1,200 to each of the poorest households
(Malay Mail 2016).
However, as Najib moved into his second term after GE13, the 1MDB
scandal had already taken centre stage and eclipsed his aunted plans of
national transformation. By the time of GE14, an unpopular GST of 6 per
cent introduced in April 2015 had already blunted the impact of Najib’s welfare
and cash-payout schemes. e rising cost of living proved to be a crucial factor
in BN’s collapse. Although the perpetuation of money politics, corruption,
and mismanagement in Najib’s government was symbolized by the 1MDB
scandal, other major scandals surfaced, too, including the mismanagement
of FELDA Global Ventures (FGV), which led to the sacking of its chairman.
FGV was formed in 2012 in one of the largest-ever public-share o erings,

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