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122                                                     Ross Tapsell

                  You can know everyone’s pro le, what they do, how they act. It’s easy to
                  analyse the behaviour of people. It’s powerful for us and signi cant if they
                  can get sentiment’ (interview, Tun Faisal, Kuala Lumpur, February 2018).
                  Others spoke of Malaysia’s not having  enough  data to produce reasonable
                   ndings: ‘rubbish in, rubbish out’ was often used by sceptics of big data
                  companies or even those who had been part of the big data collection process
                  (interview, anonymous BN campaigner, Kuala Lumpur, February 2018).
                  Many Malaysian companies are only starting to understand the value that big
                  data can bring to their companies, so the infrastructure is still being built. But
                  clearly, GE14 was the start of big data analytics for Malaysia and BN was just
                  as active in this space as was Pakatan Harapan.
                     To a large extent, BN’s big data companies operated undercover, sometimes
                  under a veil of secrecy, because their tactics are considered more useful when
                  people do not understand how they work. During the CA scandal, Najib and
                  Mukhriz’s public battle over who hired CA in Malaysia shows that employing
                  a foreign big data company was understandably considered nefarious. But even
                  prior to the CA scandal, most sta ers were not keen to speak on the record. BN’s
                  use of big data companies could be seen as the advancement of monitoring of
                  society crucial to the maintenance and reproduction of an electoral-authoritarian
                  regime’s rule. Had BN won, scholars of media and politics probably would have
                  continued to argue that regimes adapt to new technologies (see Carothers 2015)
                  and remain ‘resilient’ in the face of broader social, political and technological
                  change (see, for example, Welsh and Lopez 2018).
                     But BN lost comprehensively, and while Ra zi’s Invoke claimed it was
                  central to Pakatan  Harapan’s success, independent scholarship has yet to
                  con rm the precise impact of the big data strategy. Nevertheless, the point in
                  this chapter is not about ‘who won’ online or in the big data space, but rather
                  to use GE14 as a case study to raise questions about the role these companies
                  have in allowing for a  ourishing of democracy, or whether their professional
                  practice might actually lead to a more insular, sceptical society, and weaken
                  democracy. Now that we have established the professional practice of big data
                  companies in GE14, the task remains to analyse these practices in terms of their
                  impact on democratic discourse and their role in shaping the public sphere.

                  Questioning Big Data’s Impact on Democracy

                   e  remainder  of  this  chapter  is  dedicated  to  framing  some  of  the  issues
                  prompted by the arrival of big data companies in election campaigns. Many
                  of the broader arguments about big data companies’ impact on democracy






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