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Youth in the Politics of Transition in Malaysia 145

As Malaysia’s historic transition proceeds, it is important to monitor these
interconnecting patterns of youth participation in political parties, elections,
and decision-making. How will the new PH government perform on these
metrics? Will PH give more democratic space to youth, or will old political
elites regroup and come back to power? Based on the new trends and policies
the new Pakatan Harapan government has proposed—lowering the voting age
to 18 years old, introducing a youth parliament programme for students in
school, reinstating local government elections—there is a good possibility we
will see more youths participating in electoral politics over time. In short, the
trend since Reformasi is, as Francis Loh (2018) describes it, one of youths’
turning from the ‘small p’ politics—informal politics, to which they had
retreated after the early 1970s—back to ‘formal “Big P” Power Politics’. At
this point, while it will take more time and data to draw rm conclusions, it
is clear that youth activism is changing rapidly, in both formal and informal
politics, and is contributing to Malaysia’s transition to democracy.

Notes
1 is chapter adopts a qualitative approach in analyzing youth political involvement.
Hence, most of the data were gathered either by participatory observation (by joining
youth activities on the ground) or in-depth interviews (especially with various party leaders
and trainers for political-education programmes). In addition, some information was also
obtained from online resources such as political parties’ websites and news portals.
2 Despite the movement, the opposition did not gain much ground in the general
election of 1999: BN won 148 of 193 parliamentary seats nationwide. In the next
general election, in 2004, BN won 198 of 219 of Parliamentary seats, or 90.4 per cent
(Loh 2004). Opposition parties were very weak and most focused on consolidating
internally. Only PAS, as the oldest and the most grassroots-based opposition party in
Malaysia, had the machinery and resources to recruit among youth.
3 KAF has been accused of sponsoring anti-government subversion and promoting
‘religious pluralism’ (which Malaysian Muslim authorities see as deviant). KAF
involvement became a major issue in debates over foreign political funding in Malaysia
(for details, see Muhamad Takiyudin and Abdul Muein 2017).
4 Bantuan Rakyat 1Malaysia (BR1M, 1Malaysia People’s Aid) is a means-tested
unconditional cash transfer programme.
5 ‘B40’ refers to the lowest 40 per cent of the population in terms of income.

References
A f Pasuni. 2014. ‘ e Tussle in Terengganu: Islamisation, Shared Languages and
Blurred Identities’. In e 13th Malaysia Elections: Issues, Trends and Future
Trajectories, ed. Mohamed Nawab Bin Mohamed Isman, pp. 7–23. Singapore: S.
Rajaratnam School of International Studies.

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