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196 Hew Wai Weng
opponents have claimed it is an unconstitutional move and a precursor to the
implementation of hudud (Hew 2016). Najib Razak, the former prime minister
and UMNO president, allowed Hadi Awang to table the controversial bill in
Parliament in 2016, in order to win over support from the Islamist party and
to split PR. From then on, rumours that UMNO and PAS leaders intended
to form a unity government became more widespread. Although UMNO
and PAS contested against each other in many constituencies during GE14,
rumours of an electoral pact between the parties were prevalent, making some
PAS supporters uneasy.
As mentioned earlier, the progressive faction in PAS lost almost all its
positions during the party’s 2015 election. On 16 September 2015, its most
prominent gures left the party to establish Amanah, which positioned itself
as an ‘Islamic alternative’ to PAS (Hew 2016; Maszlee 2017b). e party
also claimed to represent the spirit and to carry on the legacy of the late Nik
Aziz Nik Mat, PAS’s former spiritual leader and former chief minister of
Kelantan. A month later, Amanah, together with the DAP and PKR, formed
a new opposition coalition, Pakatan Harapan, which Mahathir Mohamad’s
Bersatu later joined. Amanah’s founding President Mohammad Sabu, deputy
president Salahuddin Ayub, and one of its three vice presidents, Mujahid Yusof
Rawa, all held key positions in PAS before their defeat in the party election.
Another Amanah vice president, Hasanuddin Mohd Yunus, was a leader of
Pertubuhan IKRAM Malaysia (IKRAM, Malaysian IKRAM Association),
while its secretary-general, Anuar Tahir, was an activist in Angkatan Belia
Islam Malaysia (ABIM, Malaysian Islamic Youth Movement). Together with
former PAS leaders, these two organisations, especially IKRAM, were central
to the formation of Amanah.
ere are three key themes in Amanah’s vision of political Islam: maqasid
sharia, a concept that highlights Islamic values such as social justice, good
governance, and multicultural co-existence; inclusive or compassionate Islam
(Islam rahmatan lil-alamin); and qh Malaysia (the interpretation of Islamic
jurisprudence within a Malaysian context). Instead of concentrating on divisive
issues such as hudud, Amanah emphasises maqasid sharia. eir articulation
of an inclusive Islam does not mean that Amanah leaders have abandoned
Islamist ideologies. Instead, it demonstrates their wish to make Islam relevant
in contemporary contexts and to promote social inclusivity within an Islamic
framework. During my eldwork, several Amanah and IKRAM members
expressed to me the sentiment that, ‘we are not as dogmatic as PAS, yet we are
not as liberal as SIS [Sisters in Islam, a feminist Muslim organisation]. And
unlike UMNO, we are not racist’ (Hew 2016).
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