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e Battle of Bangi 199

Besides political parties and NGOs, many Muslim preachers have
contributed to the shaping of Muslim public opinion. Popular preachers
Ustaz Ahmad Dusuki Abd Rani and Ustaz Nushi Mahfodz ran for PAS in
Kota Anggerik, a state seat in Shah Alam, and Sungai Ramal, a state seat
in Bangi, respectively. e former, a nephew of the late Nik Aziz, is a well-
known religious gure, as he often gives religious talks in mosques and on
television and radio, and has a large number of social-media followers—
more than one million on Facebook and 200,000 on Instagram. Yet, Ahmad
Dusuki’s popularity did not translate into electoral support—indeed, he lost
in GE14. Another celebrity preacher, Ustaz Azhar Idrus (known as UAI), did
not contest, but frequently appears at PAS events. Of course, not all Muslim
preachers were PAS supporters. For example, followers of Perlis Mufti Mohd
Asri Zainal Abidin (Dr MAZA) and popular preacher Rozaimi Ramle seem
both to be critical towards PAS and sometimes subtly supportive of PH.
Ustaz Nik Omar, a religious teacher and the eldest son of Nik Aziz, and Ustaz
Fazwan Fadzil, the son of former PAS President Fadzil Noor, not only publicly
endorsed PH in GE14, but Nik Omar stood (unsuccessfully) as PH candidate
for Chempaka, a state seat in Kelantan. Both Ahmad Dusuki and Nik Omar
claimed to carry on the legacy of Nik Aziz: the former emphasized Nik Aziz’s
religious conservatism, while the latter stressed his social inclusivity.
ese various actors aligned in two loosely organised camps for political
Islam during GE14. On one side was a grouping of PAS, ISMA, and preachers
such as Ahmad Dusuki and Azhar Idrus; on the other was a combination of
PH (especially Amanah and PKR), ABIM, IKRAM, and preachers such as
Nik Omar and Fazwan Fadzil. Since GE14, both camps have continued to
articulate di erent Islamic discourses and to seek to in uence Malay-Muslims.
It is important to note that these are not o cial or coherent coalitions. Each
camp is itself marked by competition among ideas and strategies, as well as
power-struggles among actors—thus, it is di cult to characterise either camp
with a tidy label. Generally speaking, though, as mentioned earlier, the PAS
version of political Islam remains more exclusive and focused on the stricter
implementation of Islamic laws, while Amanah’s vision is more inclusive and
oriented toward the higher objectives of sharia.

Competing for Urban Malay Votes

e case of Sungai Ramal, a Malay-majority urban state seat in Selangor, serves
to illustrate how di erent actors shaped Muslim public opinion during the
election campaign period, as well as how PAS and PH competed over urban
Malay voters (Hew 2018b). PAS won the seat in 1999, 2008, and 2013, but PH

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