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256 Meredith L. Weiss

A 2015 initiative developed a list of proposals to reform both houses of
parliament, from restructuring the Senate to revamping rules for debate
(GCPP 2015). Other voices, such as the G25, a group of former senior civil
servants, have echoed and ampli ed those calls, for example by advocating
for select committees to improve parliamentary procedure and accountability
(G25 Malaysia 2016). Some such proposals started almost immediately to
circulate, from making the attorney general accountable to Parliament, to
centring law reform in a parliamentary commission to preclude executive
interference, to enacting transparency in and parliamentary scrutiny of
public-service appointments, including for statutory boards and government-
linked corporations (Shad 2018b). Pakatan’s election manifesto mentioned
speci c provisions for institutional reform, including nonpartisan speakers
for each chamber, separation of the roles of attorney general and public
prosecutor, suitable standing for the leader of the opposition, adequately long
sittings, structured opportunities for public input into policies, and greater
Parliamentary oversight over key appointments (Pakatan Harapan 2018a:
53–7: Janji 15 & 16). And a narrower subset of institutional reforms has
begun or is likely imminent, such as the establishment of bipartisan select
committees and revamping ministerial question times.
At a minimum, meaningful democracy will require that more legislation,
oversight, and budgeting rest with Parliament as an institution. As Shad
Saleem Faruqi lays out, and in line with earlier proposals, those roles require
earlier circulation of draft legislation and examination, including expert
feedback, in bipartisan committees; provisions to ensure that the executive
answers di cult questions from the legislature and that committees both
participate in nominations for key posts and evaluate ministries’ performance;
rules to ensure fair time for opposition and private members’ bills and
nonpartisan parliamentary administration; greater parliamentary insight into
and control over monetary policies; fair allocations for opposition MPs and an
independent ombudsman to look into citizens’ complaints; and better training
for and autonomy in hiring sta , broadcasting of parliamentary proceedings,
and ideally, an impartial temporary head of government once parliament
is dissolved before an election (Shad 2018a). Yet some of these provisions
seem already unlikely. For instance, although Mahathir broke with decades-
long precedent to name a non-Malay-Muslim attorney general, that o cial
still doubles as public prosecutor, potentially complicating prosecution of
members of the government the attorney general advises be charged (IDEAS
2018). Nor do all MPs receive equal constituency allocations, to allow them
equal opportunity to serve their constituents (and to avoid punishing those

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