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258 Meredith L. Weiss

agendas—most notably on Islam, since constitutionally, Islam is within states’
rather than federal jurisdiction (Neo 2018). But also, the combination of a
mix of governments at the state level and the fact of a new coalition in power at
the federal level allows, and may oblige, a clearer exposition of what authority
states have in a more democratic order. Moreover, Pakatan’s vow to increase
the share of oil revenues returned to Sabah, Sarawak, and other oil-producing
states entails some amount of redistribution of resources between tiers and
may increase pressure for more, particularly since Pakatan situates this promise
in its articulation of means to redistribute national wealth more fairly (Pakatan
Harapan 2018a: 19–21: Janji 3).
Resources aside, Pakatan is likely to be pressed to revisit the terms on
which Sabah and Sarawak joined Malaysia. (An initial, premature attempt at
a constitutional amendment toward that end failed, however, in April 2019;
Palansamy 2019.) While not necessary to democratic consolidation per se, the
push for autonomy has become increasingly vehement in both states over recent
electoral cycles, indicating the extent to which current political institutions fall
short of being inclusive and responsive to East Malaysian concerns. Natural-
resource revenues are central to those demands, and Sarawak had already
asserted mining rights prior to the election that federal-government-controlled
national oil and gas company Petronas is now contesting (Neo 2018). But
states’-rights claims extend also to issues of religion, language, and other
domains. Both to stave o potential secessionist pressures—not imminent,
but also not absent (e.g., Malay Mail 2016)—and to ensure non-coercive
governance, Pakatan will need to reach an institutional balance between
peninsular and East Malaysia.
Lastly, Pakatan is under pressure to restore local-government elections,
which Malaysia has not held since the 1960s. Although earlier a Pakatan
Rakyat promise, and a core demand within civil society especially in previously
Pakatan-held states, 2018’s Pakatan manifesto sidesteps the issue, nor have
the parties been so consistently focused on this reform (Rodan 2014).
Reintroducing this third tier of elected government presents a key step toward
democratic consolidation, particularly given pathologies in the system of
appointed local councils (e.g., as detailed in WDC 2008). No longer could
parties hold appointments out as rewards for the party faithful, regardless of
quali cations; small, regional, or new parties would stand a better chance of
getting a foot in the door and developing leadership and policy experience
(perhaps also facilitating women’s access to public o ce); and voters could
enforce accountability at the local level to an extent not currently possible
(see Cheng 2018). Although Mahathir himself has expressed hesitation, based

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