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44 Faisal S. Hazis

approach analyzes the interests of elites and the resources available to them in
order to understand how regime change develops and where it leads.
Elites, according to Yamokoski and Dubrow (in López 2013), are actors
who control resources, occupy key positions, and interact through power
networks. Elites may come from anywhere, as long as they possess these three
elements. Business elites, military elites, religious elites, and bureaucratic elites
are some of the di erent types of elites that play crucial roles in authoritarian
regimes. However, it is important to note that elites are limited to a small group
of people; thus, not everyone can become a member of the elite (López 2013).
In this chapter, we look at arguably the most powerful elites, political elites,
since they are capable of accumulating near-unlimited resources, occupying
the most powerful positions, and establishing the biggest power networks.
Hence, political elites play critical roles in the fall of dominant parties and in
sparking democratic impetuses.
Scholars, however, disagree on whether consensus among elites is crucial
for democratization to occur, or if it is actually elite fragmentation that is
necessary. Lijphart’s (1977) concept of ‘consociational democracy’ suggests
that cooperation among elites is critical for democratization, as they serve to
bridge ruptures and prevent extremist politics. Conversely, Roeder (2001)
argues that elite fragmentation in mature authoritarian systems is the
necessary push that leads to democratization. More importantly, Anderson
(2001) highlights that elite fragmentation produces an erosion of cohesive
party identity, making it harder for that party to repress unconducive opinions
among the mass public; an ensuing increase in public contestation, in turn,
furthers democratization. Accordingly, the literature on elite fragmentation in
mature authoritarian systems, including those centred around longstanding
hegemonic political parties, provides a strong basis for understanding the fall
of UMNO and BN in 2018. us, one needs to analyse elite actors, especially
those within the ruling party, to understand the collapse of dominant parties
like UMNO and its BN coalition.
e two schools of thought—functionalist and genetic—however, are not
mutually exclusive. Increasingly, researchers have shown that institutional
change can a ect the way elites make decisions and vice-versa. Reuter and
Gandhi (2010), for example, argue that economic performance can motivate
elites to split from the regime party. Disgruntled party members defect in times
of economic crisis in order to capitalize upon popular and elite discontent with
the regime, in the hope of successfully challenging the incumbent. Another
type of work looks at how elites’ actions can a ect institutions. For instance,
Zubizaretta (2013), who analyzes the fall of the hegemonic Colorado Party

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