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Elite Fragmentation and Party Splits 43

political elites make decisions that weaken the power of dominant parties and
eventually force a change of government.
In this chapter, I o er an actor-centred perspective on UMNO’s dismal
performance in GE14. Utilizing elite theory, this chapter argues that the fall of
UMNO in 2018 can be traced back to internal schisms that led to defections
and other institutional changes that eventually weakened the Malay party’s
grip on federal power. To explain the fall of Malaysia’s dominant hegemonic
party, this chapter employs a historical-institutionalist approach to trace elite
fragmentation within UMNO and the institutional changes that happened
as a result of that split. Elite division within UMNO occurred due to the
country’s weakening economy, which had impaired provision of rents to elites.
Consequently, some UMNO elites defected and formed new alliances with
opposition parties and civil society to unseat the incumbent government. e
rest, as they say, is history.

Elite Fragmentation and the Fall of a Dominant Party

ere are two main approaches to the study of regime change and
democratisation, the functionalist school (assuming structure-led change or
adopting macro-level analysis) and the genetic school (emphasizing actor-led
change or micro-level analysis) (Rustow 1970). Functionalists theorize that
structure has primacy over individual judgement, whereas geneticists believe
in the importance of human agency over social structure (Ajagbe 2016).
According to the functionalist school, countries that attempt to transition
from authoritarianism have to rely on a number of pre-existing socioeconomic
conditions. ese prerequisites include a vibrant civil society, a certain level of
economic development, a democratic political and civic culture, and a range of
satisfactory socio-economic indicators. Usually linked to modernization theory,
the functionalist school, however, fails to explain transitions that have taken
place in countries that are yet to have these prerequisites. It also fails to explain
why certain authoritarian regimes remain stable despite having undergone
massive socio-economic changes. Recognising these shortcomings, the genetic
school o ers an alternative perspective on the transition of government in
authoritarian states.
e genetic school focuses on the roles of elites in e ecting transitions in
authoritarian regimes. It analyzes elites’ responses to a crisis and how they move
to change the political system in ways that consequently produce outcomes
extending to regime change. e genetic school thus looks at regime change
through the interplay of elites and the kinds of decisions they make. is

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