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42 Faisal S. Hazis

host of corruption scandals plaguing the country. However, sceptics, including
within PH ranks, believed such a surge in Malay votes would not take place
because the Malay opposition was seriously divided, especially since the
departure of PAS from PR. As the biggest Malay opposition party, PAS aimed
to be a third force in GE14. e Islamic party contested 158 parliamentary
seats, far more than the 85 seats it contested in GE13. is decision paved
the way for multicornered contests mostly in Malay seats, thus raising serious
questions about PH’s prospects. In past elections, multicornered contests have
usually led to vote-splitting among opposition supporters and have ultimately
bene tted the incumbent.
On 9 May, the improbable happened. Against all odds, PH won 113 seats
while its Sabah ally, Parti Warisan Sabah (Warisan, Sabah Heritage Party) won
8, the total resulting in a simple majority in parliament—enough to end BN’s
60-year rule. Out of the 113 seats that PH won, 52 were Malay-majority. PAS
also sprang a surprise by winning 18 Malay seats, while UMNO matched PH,
with 52. e big question is, why did Malays vote so convincingly against
UMNO-BN?
Several possible explanations o er insight into this intriguing question.
e economy was a possible trigger. Malaysians, including Malays, had been
struggling with stagnant pay and rising prices for quite some time and their
patience might have been running low. In particular, the BN’s imposition in
2015 of a goods and services tax (GST), set at 6 per cent at the time of the
election, could have precipitated the Malay swing. Equally signi cant was the
long list of corruption scandals linked to BN leaders, such as those centred
around the 1Malaysia Development Berhad (1MDB) sovereign wealth fund
and the Federal Land Development Authority (FELDA). Malays could have
rejected UMNO speci cally due to resentment against Najib, who had been
especially mired in scandal. Another possible explanation is the popularity of
Najib’s former mentor, Mahathir. e Parti Pribumi Bersatu Malaysia (Bersatu,
Malaysian United Indigenous Party) leader’s presence in PH could have eased
Malays’ fear of the Democratic Action Party (DAP), which BN branded as
anti-Malay and anti-Islam.
ese arguments, although persuasive, are awed because they are not
grounded in a theoretical and empirical understanding of regime change in
authoritarian states. Dominant hegemonic parties do not fall merely due to
the appeal of short-term issues like GST and 1MDB or the popularity of
opposition leaders like Mahathir. Regime change in authoritarian states takes
place when structural changes to the countries’ socio-economic conditions
lead to changes in their political institutions and cultures and/or when

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