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58 Faisal S. Hazis

Conclusion

Post-GE14, UMNO faces the possibility of further splits and total collapse
due to party defections. From 52 parliamentarians, the Malay party is now left
with 37. at number might drop even further, especially since Mahathir has
openly invited members of UMNO and other Malay parties to join Bersatu—
much to the dismay of other PH leaders, especially from PKR. By luring
UMNO members to his party, Mahathir hopes to strengthen his party and, at
the same time, boost PH’s appeal among Malays.
Realizing PH’s poor support among Malays, UMNO plays up the issues
of Malay unity and Islamic supremacy by accusing the PH government of
undermining Malay interests and the sanctity of Islam. UMNO, as the biggest
Malay opposition party, has also taken an expected decision to join forces
with PAS in order to consolidate Malay support and, ultimately, to challenge
PH. Both PAS and UMNO rely heavily on Muslim and Malay votes: PAS
has positioned itself as the defender of Islam in the Muslim-majority country,
while UMNO champions Malay nationalism. ese support bases account for
nearly 70 per cent of the Malaysian population. Since GE14, the two Malay
parties have worked together in by-elections and in protesting the government’s
proposed rati cation of a UN anti-discrimination treaty in 2018. Besides
UMNO-PAS cooperation, the Malaysian Chinese Association (MCA) and the
Malaysian Indian Congress (MIC)—which represent the nation’s two other
main ethnic groups—have begun to discuss the possibility of a new alliance.
e consolidation of Malaysia’s opposition may present a viable threat to the
PH government. Furthermore, the issue of succession, given Mahathir’s plan
to hand o power to a younger leader mid-term, could potentially split PH
elites and threaten their young coalition’s grip on federal power.
e fall of a dominant hegemonic party like UMNO was the result of
a process of continuous intra-elite fragmentation and divisions, furthered
by institutional elements that sapped its hegemonic dominance and nally
brought the party to its epic fall. Although other social forces such as civil
society can signi cantly a ect changes in authoritarian states like Malaysia,
political elites still play key roles in determining the stability or collapse of
a dominant hegemonic party. A divided ruling elite resulted in the fall of
UMNO and BN in 2018. If PH fails to take stock of this lesson, they might
face the same experience in the next general election.

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