Page 144 - NS-2 Textbook

THE COLD WAR ERA 137

Rivadavio

ARGENTINA

Atlantic
Ocean

Gollegos WesiFa. n
1"'Ia~~Ea. 51 Falkland
Stanley
Falklandislclnds

Pacific
Ocean

o 300
MilES

The area of operations during the Falklands War of 1982.

South Atlantic, arriving off the Falklands in late April. sociated support ships. It contributed to this force level
For the next two months the battle for control of the Falk- being kept unchanged throughout the 1980s. Also, the
lands raged, involving nearly all elements of modern 1950s and 1960s had seen a trend toward the use of alu-
naval warfare. The Argentines finally capitulated on 4 minum vice steel plate in the construction of most U.S.
June, but not before the British had lost several ships, in- and British warships as a means of compensating for the
cluding two frigates and a h'ansport ship, to air-launched increased weight of habitability feahrres and new elec-
Exocet missiles fired from Argentine A4 attack planes. tronic gear. One of the major problems on many of the
Several others were damaged. One of the Argentines' British warships hit during the Falklands campaign,
few capital ships, the cruiser Gel1eral Belgral1o, was torpe- howevel~ ·was tfficonh'ollable burning of theil' aluminum
doed and sunk by a British nuclear attack submarine. structUT€S. Most U.S. ,varships built since have incorpo-
TIlough not directly involved, the U.S. Navy bene- rated steel plate wherever possible, and fire-retardant,
fited greatly fTOm the lessons learned by the British dm- shrapnel-resistant insulation is applied to any remaining
ing the war, many of which caused dramatic changes to aluminum plating used.
be implemented in our Navy. Even though they were not Finally, of course, the Falklands War demonstrated
as capable as our large-deck carriers, the two British car- once again the value of naval power pTOjection capability
riers, HMS Hermes and HMS Invincible, and their Harrier at a time when the new Reagan administration was
jump-jet air gTOUps, played a major role in taking control pushing for funds to revitalize the U.s. armed forces (to
of the air from the Argentines, without which victory reverse the post-Viemam decline). Funding for defense,
would have been impossible. The action effectively qui- particularly the Navy, would not be a significant pTOb-
eted many skeptics in Congress who had begun to ques- lem throughout the rest of the 1980s, due in no small
tion the need for maintaining fifteen carriers and their as- measure to the British success in the Falklands War.