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risk register were: health and safety, environmental, reputation, cost, schedule,
production, reserves, and net present value.

Another example of the failure of the Macondo team to fully assess risks
was its decision to only use six centralizers (as discussed in Section I). In email
about this decision, Brett Cocales wrote:

But who cares, it’s done, end of story, we’ll probably be fine and we’ll get
a good cement job. I would rather have to squeeze than get stuck above
the WH. So Guide is right on the risk/reward equation.
434

Cocales testified that the “risk/reward equation” did not have a specific
meaning within BP. The Panel found no evidence reflecting a BP risk/reward
435
calculation on the decision of how many centralizers should be used in the well
design.

The Panel found that in the weeks leading up to the blowout on April 20,
the BP Macondo team made a series of operational decisions that reduced costs
and increased risk. The Panel did not find any explicit statements by BP
personnel that any of these decisions were made as part of a conscious cost/risk
trade‐off. However, the evidence the Panel reviewed suggests that the Macondo
team made a series of decisions that cut costs and saved time. Moreover, the
Panel found no evidence that the cost‐cutting and time‐saving decisions were
subjected to the various formal risk assessment processes that BP had in place
(e.g., risk register, BP RAT, etc.). Examples of such decisions are contained in the
below chart:

434 BP‐HZN‐MBI00128409.
435 Cocales testimony at 24.

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