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The Panel’s investigation found that BP drilling engineers did not evaluate
                   or communicate the ongoing risk associated with the following:

                            The production casing shoe was set in a laminated sand‐shale interface
                              in lieu of a consolidated shale;
                            Deciding not to set an additional production casing barrier, such as,
                              setting a retainer and/or cement plug above the float collar;
                            Substantial (greater than 3,000 bbls) mud losses had occurred in the
                              open‐hole production interval, which indicated potential cementing
                              problems;
                            The planned positive testing of the casing would have only tested the
                              top wiper plug and not the cement casing track below the plug;
                            The float collar was not a mechanical barrier to well flow;
                            No cement was left above the float collar so that there would be
                              enough room to run a cement evaluation log; the log was never run;
                            The M56A and M56E sands were potentially unstable because of a
                              difference in pore pressures; and
                            There was a potential for ballooning in the open‐hole production
                              interval from 17,168 feet to 18,360 feet.

                          Instead of using the recommended risk assessment tool (the BP RAT
                   system), the Macondo engineering team used a risk register, which was a
                   spreadsheet that the team created to anticipate risks and to identify individuals
                   assigned to mitigate risks.

                          John Guide testified that a register or “ledger” was used throughout the
                                                432
                   process of drilling the well.   The Macondo team did not perform any risk
                                                                                                  433
                   analyses (or mitigation analyses) using the risk register after June 20, 2009.
                   Thus, the risk register was only utilized during the Macondo well design phase
                   and not during BP’s execution of day‐to‐day operations at the well.

                          In the risk register, BP personnel identified 23 risks while planning the
                   well.  BP personnel placed these risks into only three different categories – cost,
                   production and schedule – and chose not to categorize any of them as “health
                   and safety” risks.  For example, BP personnel identified a well control problem as
                   a “cost” and not a “health and safety” risk.  The risk categories available in the




                   432  Guide testimony, July 22, 2010, at 64.
                   433  BP‐HZN‐MBI 00269180; see Appendix J.


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