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  During April 14‐19, 2010, BP made a number of casing design changes, but
                          corresponding MOC documents were never formally completed.  Gregg
                                                                                          438
                          Walz agreed in his testimony that this was a “clerical error.”

                         The casing design changes for the Macondo well were submitted to MMS
                          for approval prior to completion of the MOC process.
                                                                                   439

                         The following operational changes were not subjected to the type of risk
                          analyses required by BP’s MOC policy:

                              (1)  Rig procedure changes such as replacing the viscous spacer with
                                   a lost circulation material.  The 450 barrel lost circulation material
                                   (M‐I SWACO Form‐A‐Set and Form‐A‐Squeeze) with polymer
                                   viscosifier and weighting material added was highly thixotropic
                                   (resistant to initiate flow) and viscous.  This would lead to a
                                   resistance to flow‐in in the colder kill line (located outside the
                                   riser), which in turn would result in the suppression of pressure
                                   readings using the kill line for the negative test.

                              (2)  The decision not to run the cement bond log lacked a proper risk
                                   evaluation because several factors were not considered such as
                                   the relatively small volume of foam cement pumped, insufficient
                                   centralization of the casing, and questionable conversion of the
                                               440
                                   float collar.

                          David Sims testified that, during 2010, BP was in the process of converting
                   from a paper MOC process to an electronic process.  He called the process a
                   “gradual, painful process.”   Whether the members of the Macondo team were
                                                441
                   using the paper or electronic process, there is evidence that they were not
                   following BP’s carefully crafted policies on operational changes.  The team’s
                   decision‐making proceeded with few or no checks and balances.  On April 17,
                   just three days before the blowout, Guide stated in an email to Sims:

                          David, over the past four days there has [sic] been so many last minute
                          changes to the operation that the WSL’s [Well Site Leaders] have finally

                   438  Testimony of Gregg Walz, Joint Investigation Hearing, October 7, 2010, at 128.
                   439  Sims testimony, August 26, 2010 at 147.
                   440  BP did not appear to ignore the MOC process in all of its decisions.  The panel found evidence
                   that the casing design changes for the Macondo well were subject to an MOC analysis.
                   441  Sims testimony at 165.


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