Page 200 - test2

The fact that the Deepwater Horizon crew members did not have available
to them accurate and reliable flow‐line sensors during cementing operations in
order to determine whether they were obtaining full returns was a possible
contributing cause of the blowout.

Various decisions by BP and Halliburton with respect to planning and
conducting the Macondo production casing cement job were possible
contributing causes of the blowout.

The failure of BP’s well site leaders and the Transocean Deepwater Horizon
rig crew to recognize the risks associated with cementing operations problems
that occurred between April 19 and April 20 was a possible contributing cause of
the blowout.

B. Flow Path

The Panel concluded that hydrocarbon flow during the blowout occurred
through the 9‐7/8 x 7 inch production casing from the shoe track as a result of
float collar and shoe track failure.

C. Temporary Abandonment, Kick Detection, and Emergency
Response

The failure of the Deepwater Horizon crew (including BP, Transocean, and
Sperry‐Sun personnel) to detect the influx of hydrocarbons until the
hydrocarbons were above the BOP stack was a cause of the well control failure.

The Deepwater Horizon crew’s (BP and Transocean) collective
misinterpretation of the negative tests was a cause of the well control failure.

The Deepwater Horizon crew’s inability to accurately monitor pit levels
while conducting simultaneous operations during the critical negative test was a
contributing cause of the kick detection failure.

BP’s failure to perform an incident investigation into the March 8, 2010
well control event and delayed kick detection was a possible contributing cause
to the April 20, 2010 kick detection failure.

195