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BP’s failure to inform the parties operating on its behalf of all known risks
associated with the Macondo well production casing cement job was a possible
contributing cause of the kick detection failure.

BP’s use of the lost circulation material pills as a spacer in the Macondo
well, which likely affected the crew’s ability to conduct an accurate negative test
on the kill line, was a possible contributing cause of the kick detection failure.

The overall complacency of the Deepwater Horizon crew was a possible
contributing cause of the kick detection failure.

Mark Hafle’s failure to investigate or resolve the negative test anomalies
noted by Donald Vidrine was a possible contributing cause of the kick detection
failure.

The failure of the well site leaders to communicate well‐related issues
with the managers onboard the Deepwater Horizon was a possible contributing
cause of the kick detection failure.

BP’s failure to get complete and final negative test procedures to the rig in
a timely fashion was a possible contributing cause of the kick detection failure.

The Deepwater Horizon crew’s hesitance to shut‐in the BOP immediately
was a possible contributing cause of the kick detection failure.

BP’s failure to conduct the first of the two negative tests was a possible
contributing cause of the kick detection failure.

The rig crew’s decision to bypass the Sperry‐Sun flow meter while
pumping the spacer overboard was a possible contributing cause of the kick
detection failure.

The failure of BP’s and Transocean’s well control training and MMS
requirements to address situations, such as negative tests and displacement
operations, was a possible contributing cause of the well control failure.

The decision to use the mud gas separator during the well control event
was a contributing cause of the response failure.

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