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BP’s failure to document, evaluate, approve, and communicate changes
associated with Deepwater Horizon personnel and operations was a possible
contributing cause of the Macondo blowout.

BP and Transocean had a bridging document that merged their respective
safety programs. The bridging document did not address well control. BP and
Transocean had stand‐alone well control manuals, and the rig crew was trained
and operated in accordance with Transocean’s manual. The failure of BP and
Transocean to ensure they had a common, integrated approach to well control
was a possible contributing cause of the Macondo blowout.

BP required its employees and contractor personnel with well control
responsibilities to be trained every two years in well control in accordance with
BP’s Subpart O plan. The Panel found that all personnel identified within BP’s
plan were trained in accordance with the BP Subpart O plan. The current
Subpart O rule does not identify personnel who should have training in well
control operations (including monitoring the well) beyond the personnel who are
interfacing with the BOP stack and drill floor operations. The failure of the
current Subpart O rule to identify (by definition) personnel who need to be
trained in well control operations, specifically in kick detection, was a
possible contributing cause of the Macondo blowout.

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