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BP’s failure to have full supervision and accountability over the activities
                   associated with the Deepwater Horizon was a contributing cause of the
                   Macondo blowout.

                        As part of BP’s operations integrity and risk management programs, BP
                   developed a systematic, risk‐based MOC to document, evaluate, approve and
                   communicate changes to facilities, systems, process, procedures, organization,
                   and personnel.  The BP MOC process did not document certain critical changes,
                   including:

                          During April 14‐19, 2010, several BP casing design changes occurred, yet
                            multiple MOC documents were never officially completed due to a
                            “clerical error.”
                          These casing design changes for the Macondo well were submitted to
                            MMS for approval prior to the MOC being approved, according to
                            testimony by Sims on August 26, 2010.
                          During a reorganization in 2010, the responsibility shift from the drilling
                            team leader (David Sims) to the drilling engineering team leader (Gregg
                            Walz) was not properly completed.
                          A MOC was not completed for the operations drilling engineer (Bret
                            Cocales) in regard to his transfer to the BP drilling engineer team.
                          Examples of BP’s failure to conduct a proper risk analysis include:
                                 (1) No formal MOC risk analysis document was completed for the
                                     well site leader transition from Sepulvado to Kaluza.
                                 (2) Rig procedure changes, such as replacing the viscous spacer
                                     with lost circulation material, were not subjected to a formal
                                     risk analysis.  The 450‐barrel lost circulation material (M‐I
                                     SWACO Form‐A‐Set and Form‐A‐Squeeze) with polymer
                                     viscosifier and weighting material added was highly
                                     thyrotrophic (resistant to initiate flow) and viscous.  This would
                                     lead to a resistance to flow in the colder kill line (located outside
                                     the riser), resulting in the suppression of pressure readings
                                     using the kill line for the negative test.
                                 (3) The decision not to run the cement bond log lacked a proper
                                     risk evaluation because several factors were not considered,
                                     such as the relatively small volume of foam cement pumped,
                                     insufficient centralization of the casing and questionable
                                     conversion of the float collar.






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