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There is no evidence that the rig crew detected or attempted to address
this anomaly. Instead, the crew proceeded to attempt to conduct the first
negative test. Well data and testimony establish that the rig crew closed the
annular around 5:00 p.m. and attempted to conduct a negative test by first
bleeding off the drill pipe pressure from 2,324 psi to 1,427 psi.
The rig crew then opened the kill line valve, presumably to try to balance
the kill line and drill pipe pressure. As the kill line pressure fell to 0 psi, the drill
pipe pressure remained at 458 psi, thus indicating that the crew may not have
fully displaced the spacer from below the BOP stack. At approximately 5:05
p.m., the crew shut in the drill pipe, and concurrently the drill pipe pressure
increased. The increase in drill pipe pressure is evidence of an unsuccessful
negative test and showed that the well was possibly flowing. In addition, the
fact that the choke pressure remained less than 0 psi shows that the negative test
229
was likely either unsuccessful or, at the very least, inconclusive. At 5:25 p.m.
the negative test concluded.
Some time between 5:17 p.m. and 5:27 p.m., Jimmy Harrell (Transocean),
Robert Kaluza (BP), Donald Vidrine (BP) and other members of the drill crew
discussed the first negative test. According to Kaluza, this discussion about the
pressure on the drill pipe was “long.” Kaluza stated that Jason Anderson,
230
Transocean assistant toolpusher, explained that the pressure was due to a
“bladder effect,” and that “this happens every time.” Brian Morel, a BP drilling
engineer who had previously raised concerns about Kaluza’s abilities to execute
procedures, was not on the rig at the time (he had departed hours earlier) to be
231
consulted on the drill pipe pressure and other anomalies.
In addition, no one involved in this “long” discussion about the negative
test consulted any of the executives visiting the rig at the time, even though these
BP officials had more than 50 years of drilling experience. At that time, the
executives, including David Sims and Pat O’Bryan, were onboard conducting a
232
rig tour and were presumably available for consultation. There is evidence
229 A reading of less than zero PSI suggests instrument error and/or an inaccurate test.
230 BP‐HZN‐MBI00021237.
231 Id.
232 The group included Pat O’Bryan and David Sims from BP and Daun Winslow and Buddy
Trahan from Transocean. They planned to discuss a number of items with the rig crew,
including (in the eyes of BP and Transocean) the rig’s record of excellent communication and low
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