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There is no evidence that the rig crew detected or attempted to address
                   this anomaly.  Instead, the crew proceeded to attempt to conduct the first
                   negative test.  Well data and testimony establish that the rig crew closed the
                   annular around 5:00 p.m. and attempted to conduct a negative test by first
                   bleeding off the drill pipe pressure from 2,324 psi to 1,427 psi.

                          The rig crew then opened the kill line valve, presumably to try to balance
                   the kill line and drill pipe pressure.  As the kill line pressure fell to 0 psi, the drill
                   pipe pressure remained at 458 psi, thus indicating that the crew may not have
                   fully displaced the spacer from below the BOP stack.  At approximately 5:05
                   p.m., the crew shut in the drill pipe, and concurrently the drill pipe pressure
                   increased.  The increase in drill pipe pressure is evidence of an unsuccessful
                   negative test and showed that the well was possibly flowing.  In addition, the
                   fact that the choke pressure remained less than 0 psi shows that the negative test
                                                                                       229
                   was likely either unsuccessful or, at the very least, inconclusive.   At 5:25 p.m.
                   the negative test concluded.

                          Some time between 5:17 p.m. and 5:27 p.m., Jimmy Harrell (Transocean),
                   Robert Kaluza (BP), Donald Vidrine (BP) and other members of the drill crew
                   discussed the first negative test.  According to Kaluza, this discussion about the
                   pressure on the drill pipe was “long.”   Kaluza stated that Jason Anderson,
                                                           230
                   Transocean assistant toolpusher, explained that the pressure was due to a
                   “bladder effect,” and that “this happens every time.”  Brian Morel, a BP drilling
                   engineer who had previously raised concerns about Kaluza’s abilities to execute
                   procedures, was not on the rig at the time (he had departed hours earlier) to be
                                                                                231
                   consulted on the drill pipe pressure and other anomalies.

                          In addition, no one involved in this “long” discussion about the negative
                   test consulted any of the executives visiting the rig at the time, even though these
                   BP officials had more than 50 years of drilling experience.  At that time, the
                   executives, including David Sims and Pat O’Bryan, were onboard conducting a
                                                                               232
                   rig tour and were presumably available for consultation.   There is evidence



                   229  A reading of less than zero PSI suggests instrument error and/or an inaccurate test.
                   230  BP‐HZN‐MBI00021237.
                   231  Id.
                   232  The group included Pat O’Bryan and David Sims from BP and Daun Winslow and Buddy
                   Trahan from Transocean.  They planned to discuss a number of items with the rig crew,
                   including (in the eyes of BP and Transocean) the rig’s record of excellent communication and low


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