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that Sims and O’Bryan met with Kaluza at some point to discuss the positive
233
pressure test and how the crew would be lining up for the negative test. But
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the crew did not consult O’Bryan or Sims about the actual negative test results.

Around 5:30 p.m., after the first unsuccessful negative test, the rig crew
began to set up for another negative test, which began by bleeding off the drill
pipe and closing an internal valve in the drill pipe for 20 minutes. Once this
valve was closed, the crew was no longer capable of monitoring the drill pipe
pressure.

Around 6:00 p.m., the crew bled the pressure from the drill pipe to the
cementing unit. At that time, the drill pipe was shut in at the cementing unit,
and the pressure on the drill pipe increased to 1,400 psi after 30 minutes. As the
pressure on the drill pipe increased, the kill line pressure also steadily increased
but only to 140 psi. This pressure differential between the drill pipe and the kill
line was another indicator that the negative test was not successful.

Around 6:45 p.m., the crew pumped a small amount of fluid into the kill
line to make sure it was full for another negative test. At approximately 7:15
p.m., the crew opened the kill line to monitor for pressure/flow consistent with
the APM approved by MMS. After approximately 40 minutes of no flow or
pressure observed on the kill line, the crew and the BP well site leaders deemed
the negative test successful and began operations to complete the displacement
of drilling mud with seawater. Notwithstanding multiple anomalies that the
crew encountered during the several failed negative test attempts, the drill crew
and the BP well site leaders decided not to flush the system and conduct a new
negative test.

Testimony from rig personnel involved with the negative test reflects that
they believed that they had successfully tested the integrity of the well by
checking for flow on the kill line. Kaluza stated that “[i]t was not
flowing…Absolutely no flow.” Miles Ezell, Transocean senior toolpusher,
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testified that Jason Anderson told him that “[i]t went good . . . We bled it off. We

rate of “days away from work.” They also planned to discuss the rig’s financial performance
(costs compared to AFEs) and ongoing risk and hazard recognition. See BP‐HZN‐MBI129014.
233 Testimony of Patrick O’Bryan, Joint Investigation Hearing, August 26, 2010, at 360, 374; Sims
testimony, May 29 2010, at 178.
234 O’Bryan testimony at 443; Sims testimony, May 29, 2010, at 179.
235 BP‐HZN‐MBI00021264.

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