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crew can conduct an accurate negative test.  In the case of the Macondo well, the
                   barrier being tested was the cement in the shoe track of the wellbore.

                          BP considered multiple negative test procedures in the days leading up to
                   April 20.  Neither BP nor Transocean had pre‐existing negative test standards
                   and procedures.  As of April 2010, MMS did not require that operators conduct
                   negative tests, and, consequently, did not specify how such tests should be
                   performed.

                          In an April 18, 2010 email entitled “Negative Test” from Brian Morel to
                   John Guide, Morel briefly explained the negative test to be conducted, stating
                   that the “[p]lan is to do a negative test with base oil on the bottom plug.  Then
                   we will displace (a second negative test to greater value will happen) and
                   following that set the cement plug.”   Morel then asked Guide:
                                                         210

                          Are you ok with this, or do you think we should remove the first base oil
                          test and just use the displacement as a negative test (shut down at the end
                          and do a flow test)?... I have got different opinions from everyone on the
                          team.  The way we currently have it set up is the standard we have been
                          using, but this one is slightly different because the plug is so deep and
                          base oil doesn’t achieve the full negative load the wellbore will see.  Don
                          [Vidrine] and Bob [Kaluza] don’t seem to have strong opinions either
                               211
                          way.

                          Guide responded by saying, “I would use the seawater displacement as
                   the negative test, as you stated, shut down at the end and do a flow test.”
                   Twenty minutes later, Morel replied, without elaboration or any evidence of
                   deliberation, “[d]one.”   Neither Guide nor Morel informed the rig crew that
                                           212
                   these changes greatly increased the risks of a well control event.

                          Transocean personnel were aware of the importance of conducting a
                   successful negative test.  Jimmy Harrell, Transocean offshore installation
                   manager, testified that “[t]he first plan I seen [sic] didn’t have a negative test in
                   it.  So I told him [Vidrine] it was my policy to do a negative test before displacing
                                    213
                   with seawater.”

                   210  BP considered a number of different negative test procedures in the days leading up to April
                   20.  The different negative test variations that BP considered are detailed in Appendix G.
                   211  BP‐HZN‐MBI‐00256247.
                   212  Id.
                   213  Harrell testimony at 26.


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