Page 26 - History of War - Issue 29-16
P. 26

Frontline
              WHY DID THE INVASION FAIL?








                      Historian and author, Roger Moorhouse, discusses how a frozen
                                    apocalypse helped to destroy the Third Reich

                                    peration       or the loss of his army. In the case of the   Kremlin in November 1941, they were   ghting
                                    Barbarossa was   Soviet Union, it worked militarily as it should:   at the end of a logistical chain of supply that
                              O arguably the       decimating the Red Army in the   eld, causing   could stretch a thousand miles, much of which
                              greatest turning point in   enormous casualties and capturing vast   ran along unmade roads. That would challenge
                              World War II and changed   swathes of territory – yet it was unable to force   their   ghting capacity even in the best of
                              global history but at a   a political defeat.              circumstances, but in the teeth of a Russian
                              dreadful cost. Here,   This was due to the vast distances involved –   winter – or even in the muddy quagmire of the
                              Roger Moorhouse, author   Moscow was over 500 miles from the German-  autumn rains – it was crippling.
                              of The Devils’ Alliance:   Soviet frontier – and the huge resources of men
              Hitler’s Pact with Stalin, 1939-1941, explains   and materiel that the Soviet Union, despite its   WAS THERE A SOVIET CONTINGENCY
              what contributed to the Nazi defeat and how   predicament, could still muster. To defeat his   PLAN TO CARRY ON FIGHTING IF
              the war with the Soviet Union led to a decisive   enemy, Hitler needed to force both a military   LENINGRAD AND STALINGRAD FELL?
              Allied victory.                      and political collapse of the USSR, and this he   The campaign on the Eastern Front was no
                                                   was simply unable to do.              conventional con  ict – no quarter was given
              DESPITE INFLICTING HUGE                                                    and none expected; it was very much a   ght to
              CASUALTIES, WHY WAS THERE NO         HOW KEY WAS THE RUSSIAN WINTER        the death – either Nazism or Communism would
              DECISIVE GERMAN VICTORY BEFORE       CONDITIONS TO CONTRIBUTING TO THE  prevail, the other would be destroyed. So, it
              THE RUSSIAN WINTER SET IN?           GERMAN DEFEAT?                        would have made little difference to the Soviets
              As the Poles, Swedes and Napoleon all learned   The winter was a challenge even for the   if Leningrad, Stalingrad, or even Moscow had
              to their cost, invading Russia is a tricky   hardiest Soviet natives, but for German   fallen. The   ght would have carried on.
              business. Germany, in 1941, had some distinct   soldiers   ghting in summer uniforms it could   Stalin had made the regime’s intentions
              advantages. Not least a marked superiority in   be deadly. Men froze at their posts, guns   clear early in the German invasion, when he
              technology and in trained manpower, it also   jammed and engines seized in their vehicles.   began the wholesale shift of Soviet heavy
              bene  ted from the new military doctrine of   Fighting became impossible, and the logistical   machinery, as well as the state apparatus and
              Blitzkrieg [Lightning War], which had proved   dif  culties of supplying troops with spare   administration eastwards, out of the range of
              highly effective and was now fully developed   parts, food and ammunition, were exacerbated.   the German invaders. The entire government,
              and understood by its practitioners.   The German Eastern Front medal was known   for instance, was moved to Kuybyshev (now
               But, though militarily revolutionary, Blitzkrieg   colloquially as the ‘Order of the Frozen Flesh’.  Samara), 500 miles east of Moscow.
              was politically rather conventional – it worked   However, it is not fair to say that the winter   Stalin also ordered the start of partisan
              by disrupting and swiftly defeating the enemy in   alone defeated the Germans; it merely   operations behind German lines, decreeing
              the   eld, thereby forcing a political surrender,   compounded their existing dif  culties. When   it to be a duty of every Red Army soldier to
              either due to the loss of the defender’s capital,   the Wehrmacht advanced to within sight of the   continue resisting to his last breath. In such

                                                                                                      Like previous invasions across the
                                                                                                     centuries, the German offensive was
                                                                                                    hugely hindered by the Russian winter
























               “HITLER NEEDED TO FORCE BOTH A MILITARY AND POLITICAL COLLAPSE

               OF THE USSR, AND THIS HE WAS SIMPLY UNABLE TO DO”




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       026-027_HOW029_Interview.indd   26                                                                                    04/05/2016   18:30
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