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Youth in the Politics of Transition in Malaysia 139

structures, is also consistent with development trends among the ‘new left’
of earlier decades, as described by Marcuse: ‘they do not yet possess any new
organisational forms, are without a mass base and are isolated from the working
class’ (Marcuse 1979: 1).

Youth in GE14: Inside and Outside Political Parties
Faced with this challenge, Malaysian political parties tried to make themselves
more appealing to youths by introducing ‘youth manifestos’ and elding a
higher number of younger candidates than previously in 2018. Moreover,
youths outside political parties also participated in GE14, taking on active
roles, contrary to media reports that claimed that youth are uninterested in
electoral politics. Surveying these developments will allow us to assess whether
these trends suggest that youths are moving back to formal politics, but with
a new dynamic.
As in GE13, the 2018 general election saw all participating political parties
giving particular attention to younger voters. e aforementioned negative
media coverage for a few months leading up to the election claimed that
youths were uninterested and apathetic (Mohd Husni 2017; Azman 2017).
Moreover, media reported heavily on an #UndiRosak (Spoilt Vote) campaign
by a small group of youths, calling for people to spoil their votes in protest
against both BN and Pakatan Harapan (Alliance of Hope, PH) coalitions,
neither which they believed capable of bringing systemic changes—prompting
many political leaders from BN, PH, and PAS to issue statements encouraging
voting (Boo and Shazwan 2017; Chandra 2018). Even so, the turnout rate in
GE14 was among the highest in history (82 per cent or 12,299,514 voters).
Spoilt votes stood at only 1.76 per cent, among the lowest share in recent
decades (Koh 2018).
GE14 also saw high youth participation speci cally, in terms of voter-
registration and votes cast. According to the Election Commission, the number
of registered voters increased by 1,672,622, to 14,940,624. at total included
a 10 per cent increase in voters from the ages of 21 to 39 (Table 7.1). ( e
voter list used was from the fourth quarter of 2017, so those who registered in
the rst quarter of 2018 were not gazetted in time to vote [G. Tong 2018].)
In terms of voter-turnout, high percentages of both youth age-cohorts, 21–29
and 30–39, voted: 80.1 per cent and 80.3 per cent, respectively (see Su an
and Lee, this volume, for details). is result repudiates earlier claims that
youth were apathetic and not interested in voting.

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