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206 Hew Wai Weng

Hence, PAS still has considerable in uence among urban Malays in the Klang
Valley. erefore, it might be premature to conclude that PAS is only a regional
party with in uence in the east coast and northern states.

Political Islam Contested
Many analysists have emphasized the role of Mahathir Mohamad in triggering
a ‘Malay tsunami’—a swing among UMNO supporters, especially those in
rural areas, towards PH. However, few of them have paid attention to the roles
of PH component parties and their allies in Muslim organisations in using
Islamic messages, albeit more inclusive ones, to convince urban Malay voters
to choose PH instead of PAS. As the GE14 results indicated, both PAS’s and
PH’s visions of political Islam have their followers and are well-represented
in parliament. PAS won 18 parliamentary seats, most of them in Kelantan,
Terengganu, and Kedah, while Amanah secured 11, more than half of them
in Selangor. e element of political Islam in the winning PH coalition is
salient also in component parties PKR and Bersatu, since there are ABIM and
IKRAM leaders in both parties. Capitalising on the aura of the well-respected
Nik Aziz through the endorsement of his eldest son, Nik Omar, has also given
PH ‘religious credentials’. erefore, this chapter challenges the perception
that only PAS voters constitute a ‘moral constituency’ (Nambiar 2018), by
showing that Malay-Muslims in the Klang Valley are not less ‘Islamic’ than
those in the east-coast states just because many of them did not vote for PAS.
Moreover, as noted above, despite not being able to win seats such as Sungai
Ramal, PAS managed to keep its hardcore base intact, securing signi cant
Malay support in these areas.
To conclude, the GE14 results re ect the enduring in uence of PAS.
e party remains a key player in political Islam in Malaysia. Yet at the
same time, PH has also o ered a viable ‘Islamic alternative’ for urban Malay
voters. Relevant actors have realigned in pursuit of distinct Islamic agendas,
hoping to win Malay-Muslim support, with the camp that PAS anchors
more exclusive and conservative-inclined, and the one PH anchors more
inclusive and progressively inclined. Such struggles around political Islam
continue as ordinary Muslims from various backgrounds engage, and through
interactions with non-Muslims. Initial post-GE14 developments indicate that
the competition over Muslim votes will continue to shape and be shaped by
political developments and religious discourses in Malaysia. For instance,
Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad has stated his intention to revamp Islamic
administration, while Minister in the Prime Minister O ce (Religious A airs)

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