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204                                                   Hew Wai Weng

                  Muslim community and non-Muslims. Compared to ‘inward-looking’ and
                  ‘Malay-centric’ PAS, PH, opined Nik Omar, had a better platform for Islamic
                  struggle in the Malaysian context. He let potential PAS supporters know that
                  even though he and other leaders had left PAS, they had not given up their
                  Islamic agenda. In other words, PAS is only one of several vehicles for Islamic
                  struggle and is not the religion itself—thus, ‘anti-PAS’ is not equal to ‘anti-
                  Islam’ ( eldnotes, 4 May 2018). Indeed, one of Nik Omar’s popular remarks
                  was, in Kelantanese Malay, ‘Ambo tidak ajak rakyat lawan Islam. Ambo ajak
                  rakyat Malaysia khususnya pakah Pakatan Harapan’ (I am not asking the people
                  to go against Islam. I am asking Malaysians to vote for PH).
                     Meanwhile, in Kelantan, Nik Omar’s brother, Nik Abduh, the PAS
                  candidate for the Bachok parliamentary seat, expressed his disappointment
                  with Nik Omar for going against their mother’s advice not to join a rival party
                  to PAS. Nik Omar was labelled ‘pro-IKRAM’ and ‘a traitor to PAS’s struggle’—
                  sentiments that caused him to su er a heavy defeat in Kelantan, the home
                  of many PAS loyalists. In contrast, in the Klang Valley, Nik Omar received
                  positive feedback from many Muslims as well as non-Muslims, suggesting
                  that urban, west-coast Malays are more open to the vision of political Islam
                  that PH championed (see also Ahmad Fauzi and Che Hamdan, this volume).
                  His talks in places such as Bangi and Shah Alam were well-attended, warmly
                  received, and widely covered in the media. Arguably, he played an important
                  role in helping PH win over fence-sitting Malay voters who would otherwise
                  have voted for PAS.
                     Some of the Klang Valley voters who have supported PAS in past elections,
                  especially since 1999, have been PAS sympathisers, but not loyalists.  ese
                  non-loyalist PAS voters have included PKR supporters, ABIM and IKRAM
                  activists, and ordinary Malays who dislike UMNO. In GE14, they faced a
                  di cult choice: whether to vote for PH or for PAS. My conversations with
                  some PAS ceramah attendees made clear that they realised that PAS could not
                  win control of the government on its own, yet they worried that PH might not
                  be able to safeguard Muslim interests. As one of them told me, ‘I know it is
                  di cult for PAS to win in Selangor after leaving PR.… UMNO is corrupted
                  and PH has no clear Islamic agenda.… I have no option but to support PAS’
                  ( eldnotes, 28 April 2018). Together with the support of ABIM and IKRAM
                  activists, Nik Omar’s endorsement boosted PH’s much-needed ‘Islamic
                  credentials’. If Mahathir Mohamad, with his ‘Malay nationalist’ outlook,
                  convinced many potential UMNO voters to switch their support to PH,
                  then Nik Omar, with his ‘Islamic credentials’, persuaded a signi cant number
                  of PAS voters, such as those in Bangi and Shah Alam, to vote for PH. Nik






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