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212                                                 Wong Chin Huat

                  competitive politics, instability of permanent coalitions, and gender imbalance
                  and weak issue-representation. Methodologically, the analysis is based on a
                  longitudinal study of election data and party positioning.


                  Malpractice 1: Inter-state Malapportionment and an Expanding
                  Legislature
                  Malapportionment of constituencies entails the manipulation of electorate
                  sizes across constituencies such that some constituencies have substantially
                  more voters than others and su er under-representation, violating the ‘one
                  person, one vote, one value’ premise of democratic elections.
                     Because parliamentary constituencies cannot be drawn to span across state
                  boundaries, their malapportionment can be divided into two parts.  e  rst is
                  inter-state malapportionment, i.e., when national parliamentary constituencies
                  are not proportionally allocated among each of the states and territories.  e
                  second is intra-state malapportionment, when the total number of voters
                  within a given state is not evenly divided across constituencies. In contrast,
                  malapportionment of state-legislative constituencies is only single-layered,
                  because their boundaries are not constrained by intra-state divisions.
                     Malaya’s  original  constitution  in  1957  started  with  mathematics  to
                  apportion constituencies at both the inter-state and intra-state levels. First, it
                  allocated parliamentary seats to states based on their shares of the electorate
                  and population.  en, each state’s electorate was divided into the allocated
                  number of parliamentary constituencies, which were further divided into state
                  constituencies,  with approximately equal numbers of voters.  e allowed
                              2
                  deviation across constituencies was just 15 per cent from the state average
                  (Lim 2002).
                     Constitutional provisions for constituency delimitation were soon amended
                  three times, in 1962, 1963, and 1974.  e 1962 amendment widened the
                  range of permissible deviation from 15 per cent to 33.33 per cent and shifted
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                  the basis of comparison from the state average to the national average.   e
                  1963 amendment deliberately introduced inter-state malapportionment
                  to underrepresent Singapore and overrepresent the Borneo states. As
                  recommended  by Paragraph 19(2)  of  the  Inter-Governmental  Committee
                  (IGC) Report in 1962, allocation of parliamentary seats was no longer based
                  on demographics, but explicitly spelled out under Article 46:

                     Article 46 (1) should be amended to increase the number of elected members
                     of the House of Representatives from one hundred and four to one hundred
                     and  fty-nine (including the  fteen proposed for Singapore). Of the additional






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