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214 Wong Chin Huat

delimitation exercises in 1974, 1977, 1984, 1987, 1994, 1996, 2003, 2005,
2015, and 2016 (Table 11.2). Instead of moving seats from demographically
shrinking states to expanding ones, which might invite backlash from a ected
incumbents, seats were added to all states over time. Increasing the number
of seats served both to overrepresent BN’s stronghold states and to maintain
coalitional unity in BN by creating tailor-made constituencies suitable for its
component parties to contest. For instance, in 2003, of 20 seats added in
6
West Malaysia, over-represented Pahang gained three while under-represented
Selangor gained only ve (Table 11.3). 7
e distorted allocation of parliamentary seats avoided parliamentary
scrutiny and public backlash because the Election Commission (EC) put the
cart before the horse, rst proposing new boundaries based on a new number
of seats and only then getting Parliament to amend Article 46. In the 2003
review, for instance, the EC’s rst proposal, on 8 August 2002, added 20 extra
seats to West Malaysia. Its nal proposal was approved on 8 April 2003 but
amendment to Article 46 was only passed on 19 June 2003 and came into
force on 14 August. From August 2002 until August 2003, Article 46 provided
for only 145 parliamentary seats for West Malaysia (including Putrajaya), yet
the EC’s proposals carved out 165 parliamentary constituencies (Table 11.4).
Even after the BN lost its two-thirds parliamentary majority in 2008, and
hence the ability to amend the constitution at will, the EC tried to continue
this unconstitutional practice by lobbying the opposition (Shahanaz 2014;
Lakshana 2014). Electoral-reform movement Bersih 2.0, however, warned the
EC that it would challenge such practices in court (Melati 2014). e EC
conceded, as Sabah and Sarawak rst amended their state constitutions to
increase state-legislature seats before commencing the delimitation process.

Malpractice 2: Intra-state Malapportionment

e 1973 constitutional amendment paved the way for uninhibited intra-
state malapportionment. e amendment emasculated section 2(c) of the
irteenth Schedule of the Federal Constitution by leaving only the clause,
‘the number of electors within each constituency in a State ought to be
approximately equal’ and removing another clause which allowed that ‘in
some cases a rural constituency may contain as little as one half of the electors
of any urban constituency’. at phrasing shields the EC from legal action if
the ratio of voters between the largest and smallest constituencies exceeds two.
e EC, however, has exploited that change by interpreting any electorate
sizes as ‘approximately equal’ in its proposals. For the 2003–05 delimitation

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